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The purposes of this study were to test Martin Fishbein and Icek 
Ajzen's model of behavioral prediction, to compare their principles of 
change (i.e., manipulating primary beliefs) with a traditional approach 
to changing attitudes and behavior (i.e., manipulating source, message, 
and receiver variables) and, finally, to assess the persuasive efficacy 
of the use of evidence in an influence attempt. In order to assess 
these relationships, a specific behavioral situation was created in which 
undergraduate speech students were given the opportunity to sign up for 
and participate in a "speech workshop,” in which participants were re­
quired to deliver a brief speech to the group.
The manipulation, designed to change subjects' intentions to 
sign up for and participate in the workshop, consisted of four deriva­
tions of a basic persuasive message based on eight primary beliefs ob­
tained in a pilot study. The messages differed only in the topic of 
communication, i.e., "signing up for the workshop" versus "speaking at 
every opportunity" and in the inclusion or non-inclusion of evidence.
The subjects for this study were 125 undergraduate students en­
rolled in basic public speaking courses at Southeastern Louisiana Uni­
versity. On the first day of class, the subjects were given information 
about the speech workshop, and their attitudes toward speaking were 
assessed. One week prior to the experimental treatment, subjects were 
given a questionnaire designed to assess 1) their intentions to sign up 
for the workshop, 2) their attitudes toward signing up, 3) their 
normative beliefs about their perceptions of what relevant others ex­
vi
pected them to do with respect to signing up and 4) their motivation to 
comply with these expectations.
On the treatment day, subjects were assigned either to one of 
the four message conditions or to a no message control group. Immedi­
ately after hearing the message each subject completed two question­
naires, the first of which was identical to the pretest questionnaire 
and the second of which assessed subjects' agreement or diagreement with 
and evaluation of the belief statements in the messages. They were also 
given a "sign up" sheet for the workshop.
Findings indicated that the Fishbein and Ajzen model could pre­
dict this kind of single act communication behavior. Hypotheses con­
cerning their principles of change as well as hypotheses concerning the 




Purpose and Significance of the Study
Traditional theories of rhetoric, in the person-to-group per­
suasive communication paradigm, emphasize the importance of documented 
supporting materials, commonly called evidence, in the production of 
attitude and subsequent behavior change (McCroskey, 1969). Working out 
of this theoretical base, persuasion theorists have traditionally 
emphasized evidence and its importance in the persuasive communication 
(Gray and Braden, 1963; Brembeck and Howell, 1952; Monroe and Chninger, 
1967; Minnick, 1968; Jeffrey and Peterson, 1971; Eisenberg and Ilardo, 
1972; McCroskey, 1972; and Samovar and Mills, 1973). In order to test 
this notion and working primarily out of the theoretical base provided 
by the Yale approach to persuasion and communication (i.e., the manipu­
lation of source, message, and receiver variables in order to obtain 
attitude change), researchers have failed to find consistent results as 
to the persuasive efficacy of evidence.
Although not specifically related to using evidence to change 
attitude and behavior, Fishbein (1967a; 1967c; 1972) and Fishbein and 
Ajzen (1975) have proposed a theory of behavior which purports to be 
able to explain the contradictory findings in the evidence literature. 
They criticize the Yale research paradigm and propose a new approach to 
persuasion. If Fishbein and Ajzen's theory is correct, then a study of
1
that theory might illuminate some of the problems with the existing 
evidence research and answer some of the questions raised by the incon­
sistent findings in the area. Furthermore, it might provide new in­
sight into the persuasive process. With these ideas in mind, the 
present investigation had four purposes: to test Fishbein and Ajzen's
model of behavioral prediction; to determine if a persuasive message 
formulated in accord with their basic principles of change was success­
ful in changing intention to participate in and sign up for a speech 
workshop; to compare Fishbein and Ajzen's principles of change with the 
Yale approach to changing attitudes and behavior; and, finally, to 
examine the effect of the use of evidence in a persuasive communication.
The remainder of Chapter 1 is devoted to summaries of previous 
research on evidence and theoretical approaches to persuasion, espe­
cially the Yale approach and Fishbein and Ajzen's approach, and a state­
ment of the problem. Chapter 2 includes a discussion of a pilot re­
search study and of the methodology of the present study. Chapter 3 
contains the results of the study and a discussion of the findings.
Summaries of Previous Research
Evidence
From twenty-one major studies designed to assess the effect of 
evidence on persuasion, no consistent pattern of attitude change has 
been uncovered. Two studies found that inclusion of evidence increased 
the amount of attitude change produced by the message; two found a trend 
in this direction, five found no significant effect on attitude change 
attributable to evidence, and the twelve studies conducted by McCroskey 
and his associates found an interaction effect.
Statistically significant results favoring inclusion of evidence 
in a speech designed to achieve attitude change were obtained by 
Cathcart (1955) and Bettinghaus (1953), the two earliest reported 
studies. Bettinghaus found that the clear identification of certain 
material as evidence contributed to persuasiveness, cathcart examined 
the relative effects of various methods of presenting evidence (no evi­
dence, evidence, evidence and documentation, and evidence, documenta­
tion and qualification of source) and found that all three evidence 
speeches produced significantly more attitude change than the no evi­
dence speech. Studies by Gilkinson, Paulson and Sikkink (1954) and 
Ostermeier (1966) demonstrated trends favoring the citation of authority 
in support of claims, however, neither of the studies met the normal 
criterion levels for statistical significance. These four studies seem 
to indicate that evidence is a significant variable in producing atti­
tude change. Later studies reveal different results, however.
Five studies found no significant effect on attitude change at­
tributable to evidence. Dresser's (1963) research on the use of "satis­
factory" and "unsatisfactory" evidence revealed no significant relation­
ship between evidence and attitude change. As with Dresser's study, 
other attempts to find a significant relationship have failed. Moreover 
these studies have examined a host of matters including use of statisti­
cal evidence (Costley, 1958); authoritative quotations and pictures 
(Wagner, 1958); augmentation of the number of citations (Anderson, 1958) 
increase in the amount of commentary designed to establish the qualifi­
cations of cited authorities (Anderson, 1958)j or the number of irrele­
vant or internally inconsistent pieces of evidence (Dresser, 1963).
Even in situations such as formal debates and political campaigns,
4which supposedly place a premium on the skilled use of evidence, the 
manner of handling such material is known typically to fall short of 
acceptable standards (Anderson and Mortensen, 1967; Dresser, 1964;
McKee, 1959; Mortensen, 1968a, 1968b).
McCroskey, in a series of twelve studies (McCroskey, 1966a, 
1967a, 1967b, 1969; McCroskey and Dunham, 1966; Holtzman, 1966; and 
Arnold and McCroskey, 1967), attempted to reconcile the inconsistent 
findings in the evidence/attitude change area. He reasoned that evi­
dence assumes importance mainly as it interacts with other factors in a 
communication situation— particularly source credibility, manner of 
presentation, and "newness” of the evidence to the audience. He found 
that the inclusion of evidence had a significant effect on attitude 
change when the speaker was low-to-moderate in credibility, the evidence 
was new to the audience, and the speech was delivered well.
The experimental literature on evidence, then, reveals no con­
sistent effect of evidence on persuasion. The theoretical base out of 
which this evidence research grew was that of the Yale Communication 
Research Program. Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen (1975) have criticized 
this approach and postulated another approach to persuasion. These two 
approaches will be examined in more detail.
Theoretical Approaches
Yale Communication Research Program; Hovland, et al.— Much of 
the impetus to controlled research on communication and persuasion came 
from the Yale Communication Research Program under the direction of Carl 
I. Hovland (Hovland, Janis, and Kelley, 1953; Hovland, 1957; Hovland and 
Janis, 1959; Hovland and Rosenberg, 1960; Sherif and Hovland, 1961), As
5defined by Hovland and his associates, communication is "the process by 
which an individual (the communicator) transmits stimuli (usually verbal) 
to modify the behavior of other individuals (the audience)” (Fishbein 
and Ajzen, 1975). Therefore in their attempt to identify the variables 
which influence the effectiveness of a persuasive communication, Hovland, 
et al., viewed their research task as the investigation of who says what 
to whom with what effect.
From this definition of communication have emerged the three 
major independent variables which are believed to influence effective 
communication, i.e., source (who), message (what), and receiver (to whom) 
variables. Also basic to the theory underlying this research is the 
assumption that the effect of a given communication depends on the ex­
tent to which it is attended, comprehended, and accepted. These are the 
internal processes, according to researchers in this tradition, which 
mediate one of four observable communication effects, i.e., "opinion" 
change, "reception" change, "affect" change and/or "action" change, all 
of which traditionally have been subsumed under one general dependent 
variable called "attitude change." Thus, according to this approach, 
the effects of source (who), message (says what), and audience (to whom) 
factors on attitude change (with what effect) are assumed to be mediated 
by attention, comprehension, and acceptance. The traditional assumption 
has been that a manipulation of any one of these independent variables 
will influence the effectiveness of the communication.
For example, in order to study the effects of the source of a 
communication, investigators in this tradition have manipulated various 
characteristics of the communicator, such as his expertise, status, 
trustworthiness, etc. , and assessed the effect of the various condi­
tions on attitude change. Receiver variables or individual differences 
have been dealt with in terms of general persuasibility, initial opin- 
ions, intelligence, self-esteem, cognitive complexity, and various other 
personality traits. Investigators have also manipulated message charac­
teristics in attempts to study the effects of different types of commun­
ications. One-sided messages have been compared with two-sided messages 
(Hovland, Lumsdaine, and Sheffield, 1949), emotional messages have been 
compared with logical messages (Knower, 1935; Becker, 1963; Clevenger 
and Knapprath, 1966; Cohen, 1957; Hartman, 1936; Hovland, et; al_., 1953;) 
high fear appeals with low fear appeals (Janis and Feshback, 1953;
Secord and Backman, 1964; Powell, 1965; Leventhal and Niles, 1964; 
McGuire, 1968a), and the order of arguments in the message has been 
varied (Lund, 1925; Knower, 1936; Janis and Feierabend, 1957; Anderson, 
1959; Cromwell, 1950; Insko, 1964; Wilson and Insko, 1968).
The evidence research previously reviewed fits into the message 
factors category. The approach has been to manipulate the amount or 
type of evidence in order to determine its effect on attitude change. 
Underlying this approach, again, is the assumption that evidence in some 
way affects the internal mediating processes of attention, comprehension 
and acceptance, and these, in turn, affect the dependent variable or 
attitude change. Traditional persuasion theorists have assumed that evi 
dence is an important factor in persuasion. If comprehension is, indeed 
a mediator of attitude change as Hovland, trt al^ ., assume it to be, then 
one might intuitively expect that including evidence in a persuasive 
communication might facilitate comprehension and acceptance of the mes­
sage, and therefore produce more attitude change than a persuasive com­
munication with no evidence. In order to assess this assumption, a
7researcher working out of this theory would choose some target object, 
for example, abortion. He would write a persuasive communication about 
the object in which, for example, including or not including evidence 
would be the manipulation. Next, he would assess the amount of attitude 
change toward the target object, and, finally, he would compare the 
amount of attitude change among conditions. Because the traditional 
assumption has been that evidence is important in the persuasive process, 
researchers generally expect to find the evidence condition to be more 
persuasive than the no-evidence condition.
The majority of researchers in communication and persuasion have 
viewed the persuasive process in just this way. And yet in all three 
areas of research— attempts to assess the effects of source, message, 
and receiver variables on attitude change toward some target object—  
there are inconsistent findings. Furthermore, these studies have re­
vealed either a low correlation or no correlation between attitude 
change toward the target object and behavior change with respect to the 
target object. In a recent review of over thirty studies directed at 
investigating the attitude/behavior relationship, Wicker (1969) con­
cluded that, "Taken as a whole, these studies suggest that it is con­
siderably more likely that attitudes will be unrelated or only slightly 
related to overt behaviors than that attitudes will be closely related 
to actions" (p. 65). Consistent with Wicker, McGuire (1969) stated 
that, "Attitude research has long indicated that the person's verbal 
report of his attitude has a rather low correlation with his actual 
behavior toward the object of the attitude" (p. 156). Similarly, other 
investigators have answered the questions of whether attitudes predict 
behavior and whether change in attitudes leads to changes in behavior in
8the negative, largely as a result of the inconsistent findings in atti­
tude research and the lack of a behavior/attitude relationship.
However, many researchers interested in communication and per­
suasion have worked out of this learning theory based approach to per­
suasion, i.e., they have examined the effects of variations in source, 
message, or receiver on one or more destination variables. Again, this 
approach has not proved very fruitful. The idea that source, message, 
and receiver variables might not be the indirect antecedents of attitude 
change has not been questioned until recently. Furthermore, the major 
dependent variable in most studies has been some measure of "attitude 
change" with respect to some target object, which could mean anything 
from a change in a belief about the object, to a change in an attitude 
toward the object, to a change in intention to perform some behavior 
with respect to the object. Relatively little attention has been paid 
to changes in actual behaviors, and those studies which have examined 
attitude toward the target object and behavior with respect to that 
object, again, have revealed low or no correlation between the two 
dependent variables (Wicker, 1969; McGuire, 1969).
Fishbein and Ajzen's Theory of Behavior--Recently Fishbein 
(1967a; 1967b; 1967c; 1972) and Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) have proposed 
a behavior theory based model of behavioral prediction. Although 
Fishbein's theory, based on Dulaney's (1968) theory of propositions1 
control, does not relate specifically to the use of evidence to change 
attitudes and behavior, the theory purports to be able to account for 
the contradictory findings in the evidence literature, as well as being 
able to explain the apparent attitude/behavior dichotomy. Before re­
9vealing Fishbein*s explanation of these phenomena, however, it is first 
necessary to examine the basic assumptions and constructs upon which the 
theory is based.
According to Fishbein, the confusion and ambiguity surrounding 
the attitude/behavior relationship is primarily a result of investiga­
tors' inability to agree on an explicit definition of attitude (cf. 
McGuire, 1969; Elizur, 1970; Kiesler, Collins and Miller, 1969). In 
reviews of the attitude concept (e.g., Campbell, 1963; Greenwald, 1968), 
this diversity of proposed definitions has been made explicit. Although 
some reviewers have attempted to provide an integration of these dif­
ferent definitions (e.g., Allport, 1935; Nelson, 1939), more recently 
they have tended to acknowledge "the diversity of attitude definitions 
and [to despair] of finding consensus or justification for one defini­
tion as opposed to others" (Greenwald, 1968, p. 361.)
Furthermore, as McGuire (1969) pointed out, attitude measurement 
procedures vary widely across studies. Indeed, most investigators 
merely intuitively select the particular measurement procedure that 
seems to fit the purposes of their particular studies. Support for this 
argument comes from Fishbein and Ajzen (1972). In a review of research 
published between 1968 and 1970, these investigators found more than 
five hundred different operations designed to measure attitude. In­
cluded in these operations are standard attitude scales (e.g., Likert, 
Guttman, Thurstone, and semantic differential scales); single statements 
of feelings, opinions, knowledge, or intentions; observations of one 
or more overt behaviors; and physiological measures. Single-response 
measures illustrate most clearly the wide range of operations that have 
been employed (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). In all these measures, atti-
10
tudes, opinions, values, intentions, or other "attitudinal" concepts are 
inferred from observations of a single act.
Support for the idea that reliance on intuitive selection of 
attitude measurement procedures which seem to fit the purpose of a study 
may and probably will lead to conflicting results and different conclu­
sions concerning the relations between attitude and other variables 
comes directly from the plethora of inconsistent findings reported by 
experimenters in this area. Furthermore, the intuitive selection of 
attitude measures which fit the particular study under investigation is 
a direct result of the fact that no adequate conceptual definition of 
attitude has been accepted by all researchers. An explicit definition 
of attitude appears to be a minimal prerequisite, then, for the develop­
ment of valid measurement procedures.
According to current views in philosophy of science, the meaning 
of a concept should be defined in terms of its relations to other con­
structs in a theoretical network {Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). However, 
as Kiesler, Collins and Miller (1969) have pointed out, "all too often 
social psychologists have tried to make their definition of attitude 
both a [conceptual) definition and a theory of the concept" (p. 4). For 
example, most researchers would probably agree that attitude can be 
described as "a learned predisposition to respond in a consistently 
favorable or unfavorable manner with respect to a given object" (Fish­
bein and Ajzen, 1975, p. 15). Agreement on this description of attitude, 
however, does not eliminate the existing disagreements among attitude 
investigators. On the contrary, this definition of attitude merely 
serves to obscure the disagreements by providing a description with 
multiple interpretations.
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The conceptual distinctions which Fishbein and Ajzen make among 
their four basic constructs seem to offer some hope for resolving the 
problems previously discussed. The foundation for their conceptual 
framework is provided by the distinction they make among beliefs, atti­
tudes, intentions, and behaviors. Furthermore, Fishbein and Ajzen argue 
that if the attitude area is ever to be understood adequately, then the 
distinction must be made among these four constructs.
One distinction that has been repeatedly proposed is the trilogy 
of affect, which refers to a person's feelings toward and evaluation of 
some object, person, issue or event; cognition, which denotes a person’s 
knowledge, opinions, beliefs and thoughts about the object; and conation, 
which refers to a person's behavioral intentions and his actions with 
respect to or in the presence of the object. A distinction needs to be 
made between behavioral intentions and actual behavior, however, since, 
when dealing with attitudes, one is concerned with predispositions to 
behave rather than with the behavior itself. Thus a classification con­
sisting of four broad categories may be made: cognition (opinions,
beliefs), affect (feelings, evaluations), conation (behavioral inten­
tions) , and behavior (observed overt acts). Fishbein and Ajzen use the 
term "belief" to refer to the cognitive category, "attitude" to refer 
to the affective category, "intentions" to refer to the conative cate­
gory, and "behavior" to refer to the behavioral category. Again, the 
foundation of their conceptual framework is provided by the distinction 
they make among beliefs, attitudes, intentions, and behaviors. The 
major concern of the framework, however, is with the relations between 
these variables. Therefore, the four constructs proposed by Fishbein 
and Ajzen will be examined in terms of defining these constructs
12
and showing how they are related one to the other. While reading this 
discussion, one should keep in mind that underlying their conceptual 
framework and basic to their theory is the idea that man is a logical, 
rational, information-processing animal who uses the information at his 
disposal to make judgments, form evaluations and arrive at decisions.
Beliefs represent the information a person has about an object 
and are the fundamental building blocks in Fishbein and Ajzen’s concep­
tual structure. Specifically, a belief links an object to some attri­
bute. For example, the belief "Russia is a totalitarian state” links 
the object "Russia" to the attribute "totalitarian state." The object 
of a belief may be a person, a group of people, an institution, a 
behavior, a policy, an event, etc., and the associated attribute may be 
any object, trait, property, quality, characteristic, outcome, or event. 
People learn or form beliefs about an object by direct observation, by 
receiving information from outside sources, and by way of various infer­
ence processes.
Furthermore, with respect to any object-attribute association, 
people may differ in their belief strengths, i.e., they may differ in 
terms of the perceived likelihood that the object has (or is associated 
with) the attribute in question. Therefore, belief may be measured by 
a procedure which places the subject along a dimension of subjective 
probability involving an object and some related attribute. The total­
ity of a person’s beliefs about an object and the subjective probability 
with which he holds that object-attribute link serve as the informa­
tional base that ultimately determines his attitudes, intentions, and 
behaviors.
Attitude, on the other hand, refers to a person's favorable
13
or unfavorable evaluation of an object-attribute link. This assump­
tion— that the major distinguishing characteristic of the attitude con­
cept is its evaluative or affective nature--is consistent with most 
theories of attitude. As with beliefs, an information-processing ap­
proach is viewed as underlying the formation of attitudes. Specifically, 
a person's attitude toward an object is based on his salient beliefs 
about that object and his evaluation of those beliefs. Since most 
people hold both positive and negative beliefs about an object, an 
attitude is viewed as corresponding to the total affect associated with 
their beliefs. Thus, a person's attitude toward some object is related 
to the set of his beliefs about the object but not necessarily to any 
specific belief. For example, if a person holds the belief that Russia 
is a totalitarian state and his evaluation of totalitarianism is nega­
tive, i.e., totalitarianism is not good, and if his evaluation of the 
majority of attributes he has associated with Russia are negative, then 
that person's attitude toward Russia should also be negative. This con­





A0 * attitude toward the object, 
b.^  = beliefs about the object,
e^ = the subjective evaluation of those beliefs, and
n * the number of beliefs.
It can thus be seen that a person's attitude toward some object (AQ ) is
determined by the sum of his beliefs that the object has certain attri­
butes {b^) multiplied by his evaluation (e^) of those attributes. Peak
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(1955), Rosenberg (1956), Fishbein (1963) and others have provided em­
pirical support for this concept of attitude. Specifically, attitude 
was found to be highly correlated with the sum of beliefs, each multi­
plied by its respective evaluation aspect. Attitude, therefore, should 
be measured by a procedure which locates the subject on a bipolar af­
fective or evaluative dimension for each belief he holds for a given 
object.
Fishbein and Ajzen's third construct, behavioral intention, 
refers to a person's intentions to perform various behaviors. According 
to their theory, an individual's intention to perform any behavior in a 
given situation is a joint function of his attitude toward performing 
the act (Aact) and of his beliefs about what he is expected to do in 
that situation, i.e., his normative beliefs (NB) . These normative 
beliefs are, in turn, multiplied by the individual's motivation to com­
ply with the norms (Me). The two major components (Aact and NB[Mc]) are 
weighted for their importance in the prediction of behavioral intentions, 
as can be seen in the following algebraic expression developed by Fish­
bein and Ajzen (1975):
BI = [Aact]w0 + [NB(Mc)]w^
where,
BI * behavioral intention,
Aact =* attitude toward performing a given behavior in a given 
situation,
NB = normative beliefs,
Me * motivation to comply with the norms, and 
wQ & w^ * empirically determined weights.
The Aact component of this model can be more fully understood by
15
reconsidering the general attitude construct discussed previously. It 
will be remembered that a person's attitude toward an object is equal to 
the sum of his beliefs about that object multiplied by his evaluation of 
those beliefs, or:
n
A0 * Z biei 
i=l
A person's attitude toward performing a specific behavior is determined 
by these same components, or:
n
Aact = 1 ^iei
i=l
where,
Aact = the person's attitude toward performing a particular 
behavior,
b^ = the belief about the consequences of performing the par­
ticular behavior in a given situation, i.e., the proba­
bility or improbability that the performance of
behavior X will lead to some consequence Y^,
e^ = the evaluative aspect of b^, i.e., the subject's evalua­
tion of Y^, and 
n = the number of beliefs.
Thus a person's attitude toward performing a specific behavior (Aact) 
is equal to the sum of his beliefs about the consequences of performing 
that act (b^ ) multiplied by his evaluation of those consequences (e^).
Thus, according to Fishbein and Ajzen's model, one may predict 
BI if he knows the person's attitude toward performing that behavior 
(Aact), his normative social beliefs with respect to that behavior (NB), 
his motivation to comply with what he perceives others expect him to do 
with respect to that behavior (Me), and the importance each component
plays in determining his decision to do the specific behavior (wQ and
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w^). These empirically determined weights (wQ and w^) deserve a special 
word of attention. According to Fishbein and Ajzen, if the two major 
components [Aact] and [NB(Me)] are known, then one can accurately pre­
dict BI. However, in any given situation for any given behavior, one or 
the other of these components may be more inportant in determining what 
the person's intentions are with respect to a given behavior: i.e., in
one situation a person's intentions may be determined primarily by his 
attitude toward performing the behavior in question; in another situa­
tion, however, whether a person intends to perform a given behavior may 
be primarily determined by what he perceives relevant others think he 
should do. Thus in any attempt to predict intent, the investigator must 
first determine which of the two components is more important to the in­
dividual in that particular situation in determining his intent to per­
form or not perform a particular behavior. This may be done by using 
the multiple regression statistic.
A number of studies based on the intentional model described 
above have been conducted (Fishbein, 1966; Ajzen and Fishbein, 1969, 
1970, 1972; Fishbein, et al., 1970; Ajzen, 1971; Hornik, 1970; DeVries 
and Ajzen, 1971; Carlson, 1968; McArdle, 1972; Darroch, 1971; Glassman, 
1971; Jaccard and Davidson, 1972). These studies have attempted to pre­
dict a variety of intentions, including intentions to cooperate or com­
pete, to buy certain products, to sign up for an alcoholic treatment 
program, to perform various leisure-time activities, to use certain 
types of contraceptives, to cheat on exams, and to engage in premarital 
sexual intercourse. The evidence strongly supports the intentional 
model by showing that the two predictors, Aact and NB(Me), offer high 
multiple correlations with behavioral intentions, with the average mul­
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tiple correlation over all these studies being .746 (Fishbein and Ajzen, 
1975).
The fourth and final construct to which Fishbein and Ajzen refer 
is behavior. Specifically, they are interested in overt behaviors that 
are studied in their own right, i.e., obtaining a measure of overt be­
havior because one is interested in that particular behavior and is try­
ing to understand its determinants. One might assert that most previous 
attitude studies have been concerned with overt behavior, since they 
generally obtain either a written (questionnaire) or verbal response. 
These responses are, after all, observable acts of the subject. These 
behavioral responses differ from Fishbein and Ajzen's concept of be­
havior, however, because such responses traditionally are not treated as 
records of behavior but are used, instead, to infer beliefs, attitudes, 
or intentions.
One of the most inportant assumptions of Fishbein and Ajzen's 
theory is that the effects of the Aact and NB(Me) components on overt 
behavior are held to be mediated by BI. The prediction of behavioral 
intentions is, therefore, a necessary as well as sufficient condition
for the prediction of overt behavior. This relationship is expressed
algebraically (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) as follows:
B ~ BI = [Aactjw^ + [NB(Me)]w^
where,
B = overt behavior,
BI = behavioral intention,
Aact = attitude toward performing a given behavior in a given 
situation,
NB =*= social normative beliefs,
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Me = motivation to comply with social normative beliefs, and 
wQ & w^ ■ empirically determined weights.
According to Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), most social behavior is 
volitional. Therefore, barring unforeseen events, a person should per­
form those behaviors he intends to perform, thus a high correlation is 
assumed to exist between BI and actual behavior. The studies cited pre­
viously in support of the BI component also support the high correlation 
between B and BI. Such an intimate relationship between BI and B, of 
course, will not hold unconditionally. A number of factors determine 
the BI-B relationship, and in order to obtain a high correlation between 
the two, certain conditions must be met. First, the behavior must be 
under the volitional control of the subject. If it is not, then no mat­
ter what the subject's intentions are, there is a possibility that he 
may not be able to carry them out. Second, the time lapse between the 
measure of BI and B should be as short as possible. A person may intend 
to perform a specific behavior. However, if a large amount of time 
elapses between his statement of intent to perform the behavior and the 
time the actual behavior is to be done, then other intervening events 
could possibly change his intentions. Finally, measures of Aact, NB(Mc), 
and behavioral intent must be obtained at the same level of specificity. 
In other words, the more specific the measure of intention is to the 
behavior that is to be predicted, the higher the intention-behavior cor­
relation will be. This last condition is of major importance in ex­
plaining the low correlation traditionally found in attitude/behavior re­
search. Therefore, specificity of measurement will be considered in 
more detail in the next section of this paper.
The theoretical framework presented by Fishbein and Ajzen makes
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a systematic theoretical analysis of attitude research possible. Again, 
the foundation for their conceptual framework is provided by the dis­
tinction made among beliefs, attitudes, intentions and behaviors. The 
major concern of the conceptual framework, however, is with the rela­
tions between these variables.
Comparison of Theoretical Approaches
A review of literature on evidence and its persuasive efficacy 
revealed inconsistent findings. Based on Fishbein and Ajzen's theory, 
these inconsistent findings are due primarily to two problems— the model 
of change used (i.e., manipulating source, message, or receiver 
variables and expecting to get attitude or behavior change) and failure 
to identify specifically and/or differentiate the dependent variable 
under consideration. The latter problem will be dealt with first.
As was previously explained in the discussion of the theoretical 
base of the Yale Research Program, traditional attitude researchers have 
paid very little attention to the dependent variables under considera­
tion. Generally they purport to measure "attitude change" after having 
manipulated some independent variable. In reality, however, the 
variable which they are measuring may range, in terms of Fishbein and 
Ajzen's theoretical constructs, anywhere from belief change, to attitude 
change, to intention change, to behavior change. Due to the lack of 
measurement specificity of the dependent variable under consideration, 
Fishbein and Ajzen postulate that a researcher probably will not obtain 
a high correlation between attitude and behavior, nor should he expect 
one.
Furthermore, performance of a specific behavior may or may not
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be related to the attitude object under consideration. A subject's at­
titude toward an object will be related only to the total behavioral 
pattern of the subject rather than to any specific behavior with respect 
to the attitude object. In other words, while multiple act behaviors 
may be predicted by knowing a subject’s attitude toward an object, 
single act behaviors may not.
Fishbein and Ajzen do not say, however, that specific behaviors 
cannot be predicted. To the contrary, these theorists maintain that 
prediction of single act criteria is not only possible but relatively 
easy. If one wants to know whether an individual will perform a given 
behavior, Fishbein and Ajzen maintain that the "simplest and probably 
most efficient thing one can do is to ask the individual whether he in­
tends to perform the behavior" (Fishbein, 1973, p. 14).
Herein lies one of the problems with traditional studies of the 
attitude/behavior relationship. As was indicated previously, almost all 
of the studies dealing with this relationship have been conducted using 
the following procedure: on the basis of the general attitude toward
scone object, investigators have attempted to predict a very specific 
behavioral criterion. It is not surprising, then, that in these studies 
a lack of correlation between attitudinal and the behavioral measures 
was found, nor do these studies say very much about the attitude/ 
behavior relationship. Thus one can arrive at the conclusion that 
traditional attitude measures should not be expected to predict single 
act criteria. However, when the predictor is appropriate to the criter­
ion, behavioral prediction of single acts is not only possible— it is 
quite likely. Furthermore, prediction of single act criteria can be 
accurately done by using Fishbein's model of behavioral intent, the
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algebraic expression of which is written as follows:
B - BI - [Aact]wQ + [NB(He)]w^
In this model, the predictor variables (Aact, or the person's attitude 
toward performing a specific act, and NB(Mc), or his beliefs about what 
relevant others think he should do with regard to performing this speci­
fic act and his motivation to comply) are, indeed, appropriate to the 
criterion variable (BI, or the person's intention to perform that speci­
fic act). It is important to note that the model identifies three kinds 
of variables that function as the basic determinants of behavior: Aact,
NB(Me) and the weights of these predictors. Any additional variable is 
held to influence BI only indirectly by influencing one or more of these
determinants. Thus, situational variables, personality characteristics,
and, indeed, a person's attitude toward some target object will influ­
ence a person's behavioral intentions (and thus his behavior) if, and 
only if, they are related to Aact, to NB(Me), or if they influence the 
relative weights that are placed on these predictors.
The inconsistent findings in the evidence area, then, may be ac­
counted for, at least partially, on the basis of the above discussion. 
Since the research on the persuasive efficacy of evidence was done using 
the Yale approach, primarily, i.e. formulating a persuasive communica­
tion about some target object and then assessing the effects of that 
message on a rather ambiguous, general dependent variable called "atti­
tude change," then perhaps this research needs to be re-examined in 
light of the proposed theory.
The inconsistent findings in the evidence area may also be due 
to a second major problem identified by Fishbein and Ajzen— the strategy 
of change used. The traditional strategy of change utilized in the
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majority of attitude studies has been based on the concepts of who 
.source) says what (message) to whom (receiver) and with what effect 
(destination or dependent variable). These three types of variables—  
source, message, and receiver— have been manipulated in many different 
ways in order to determine their effects on the influence process. The 
studies in persuasion and communication based on this notion have re­
vealed very few consistent findings. Fishbein and Ajzen have set forth 
some basic principles of change which they believe can account for these 
inconsistent findings.
Throughout their theory, Fishbein and Ajzen made it clear that 
the notion of belief occupies a central role in their conceptual struc­
ture. A person's belief about an object was described as the perceived 
probabilistic relation between that object and some attribute. Further­
more, they attempted to show that the formation of one belief may lead 
to the development of other inferential beliefs, that a person's atti­
tude is determined by his salient beliefs about the attitude object, and 
that beliefs about a given behavior and about the expectations of rele­
vant others vis-A-vis that behavior determine a person’s intention to 
perform that behavior and thus also influence the overt behavior itself.
This conceptualization makes it clear that an influence attempt, 
in the final analysis, must always be directed at one or more of the in­
dividual's beliefs. Furthermore, beliefs may be directly influenced in 
one of two ways: through active participation, i.e., a person is placed
in a situation where he can personally observe that an object has a 
given attribute; or through a persuasive communication, i.e., the person 
may be told by an outside source that the object has the attribute in 
question. The persuasive communication strategy of change is the one
23
which is of interest to this study.
Fishbein and Ajzen identify several different types of beliefs 
which are central to the influence process. Beliefs which serve as the 
fundamental determinants of the dependent variable, whether that depend­
ent variable be belief change, opinion change, or intent change, are 
termed "primary beliefs." Furthermore, the primary beliefs which serve 
as the fundamental determinants of a dependent variable vary across de­
pendent variables. In other words the primary beliefs which determine 
an individual's attitude toward birth control, in general, differ from 
the primary beliefs which determine an individual's intention to take 
birth control pills. For example, when the dependent variable is the 
attitude toward an object, beliefs about that object's attributes or 
characteristics are some of the primary beliefs at which an influence 
attempt may be directed. When the dependent variable is attitude 
toward a behavior, primary beliefs associate the behavior with attri­
butes such as costs or consequences. In any persuasive communication, 
any object-attribute association to which an individual is exposed may 
be viewed as an "informational item." The individual's belief directly 
corresponding to an informational item is termed a "proximal belief,"
i.e., the receiver's initial (pre-exposure) subjective probability con­
cerning this object-attribute link. In developing the influence attempt 
or the persuasive communication, the researcher attempts to select those 
informational items which he believes serve as primary beliefs them­
selves or are related to the primary beliefs. These informational items 
in the communication are called "target beliefs." An influence attempt 
may have an effect on "external beliefs," that is, on beliefs that do not 
correspond to any of the informational items provided by the communica­
tion. Changes in external beliefs resulting from an influence attempt 
are termed "impact effects." Like direct effects on proximal beliefs, 
these indirect impact effects will influence the dependent variable only 
if the external beliefs affected serve as primary beliefs or if they are 
related to the primary beliefs.
To summarize the discussion thus far, an influence attempt is 
designed to change some dependent variable, whether it is a belief, an 
attitude, an intention or a behavior. The influence attempt should be 
directed at certain target beliefs that are assumed to be the primary 
determinants of the dependent variable in question. Clearly, changing 
target beliefs will influence the dependent variable only when this 
assumption is met. To produce the desired changes in his target beliefs, 
the investigator somehow exposes his subjects to a set of informational 
items. Resulting changes in the receiver's proximal beliefs may initi­
ate a chain of effects, ultimately leading to a change in the dependent 
variable. From these considerations, Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) have 
developed four principles of change:
1. The effects of an influence attempt on change in a dependent 
variable depend on its effects on the primary beliefs underlying 
that variable.
2. The effects of an influence attempt on change in a dependent 
variable are ultimately the result of changes in proximal beliefs 
and of impact effects.
3. The effects of an influence attempt on change in beliefs, 
attitudes, intention, and behaviors depend, in that order, on an 
increasing number of intervening processes.
4. An experimental manipulation can affect amount of change in 
a dependent variable only to the extent that it influences 
amount of change in proximal and external beliefs (Fishbein 
and Ajzen, 1975, pp. 406-409).
This last principle of change is basic to an understanding of
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the inconsistent findings in the evidence area. Fishbein and Ajzen argue 
that in order for an influence attempt to be successful the information 
to which subjects are exposed must produce changes in their beliefs.
Most traditional studies of change, however, not only expose subjects to 
some information but also manipulate one or more independent variables 
and measure the effects of the manipulation on the amount of change in 
the dependent variable. For example, in a study of persuasive communi­
cation, subjects might receive a message that is ultimately designed to 
change their attitudes toward family planning. In one condition the 
message might include "good” evidence, as traditionally defined, whereas 
in a second condition the same message might include "bad” evidence.
The purpose of the experiment would be to show that with different types 
of evidence, the same message will produce different amounts of attitude 
change. According to Fishbein and Ajzen, manipulations of this sort— in 
terms of source, message, and receiver variables— merely serve to facili­
tate or inhibit change in a dependent variable. They are not, however, 
sufficient conditions in and of themselves to obtain the desired change. 
Once again, an influence attempt, according to their theory, can only be 
successful to the extent that it changes, at the very least, the speci­
fic proximal or external beliefs which underlie the dependent variable 
in question. The crucial question for the researcher thus becomes a 
question of identifying the factors which are responsible for change in 
the proximal beliefs.
Fishbein and Ajzen argue that changes in proximal beliefs, and 
thus corresponding changes in the dependent variable, are determined 
primarily by the acceptance of source beliefs. Within Fishbein and 
Ajzen's model of the persuasive process, "acceptance” is viewed as being
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equivalent to belief strength. That is, a person's acceptance of a 
belief is indicated by his subjective probability that the object- 
attribute relation in question is true. For example, consider the per­
suasive communication comprising such a statement as, "There is an 
eighty percent chance that the President is seriously ill.” The source 
probability in this case is .80. The subject's acceptance of this 
source belief refers to his agreement with the source belief. Complete 
acceptance of a source belief occurs when the receiver's post-exposure 
probability corresponds exactly to the source probability. In the ex­
ample above, complete acceptance could be shown to have occurred if the 
subject indicated a subjective probability of .80 that, "The President 
is seriously ill." Thus acceptance may be viewed as being equivalent 
to belief strength and, hence, must be measured that way. Furthermore, 
acceptance of a source belief does not necessarily indicate a change in 
the proximal belief. For example, a person may exhibit complete ac­
ceptance of a source belief with a subjective probability of 1.0. How­
ever, if prior to exposure he already held the same belief with a proba­
bility of 1.0, then no change would be expected.
The probability that a source belief will be accepted is a func­
tion of two major factors: discrepancy between source and proximal be­
liefs and overall facilitation. Other things being equal, probability 
of acceptance decreases with discrepancy and increases with facilitation. 
The discrepancy between the probability implied by the source belief, 
i.e., the source probability (ps), and the receiver’s proximal probabil­
ity (pr) influences the probability that a source belief will be ac­
cepted. Specifically, the greater this discrepancy, the lower should be 
the probability of acceptance. Although the exact nature of the rela­
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tion between acceptance and discrepancy is unknown, Fishbein and Ajzen 
tentatively assume an inverse linear relation in order to clarify this 
concept. This relation has been expressed by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) 
as follows:
p(a) = 1 - D
where,
p(a) is the probability of acceptance, and
D is the absolute discrepancy between source and proximal 
probabilities.
For example, consider a person whose subjective probability is .70 that 
"heavy drinkers have serious marital problems." The probability that he 
would accept a source belief of .75 that "heavy drinkers have serious 
marital problems" can be confuted as follows: since D = [pg - Prl, then
p{a) = 1 - [ps - pr] * 1 - .05 * .95. In comparison, for a receiver 
with an initial proximal belief of .40, the probability of acceptance 
would be 1 - .35 * .65. The idea that amount of discrepancy influences 
acceptance of a message is not a new one (cf. Sherif and Hovland, 1961).
Facilitating (or inhibiting) factors also influence probability 
of acceptance of source beliefs. Specifically, Fishbein and Ajzen 
assert that as the overall level of facilitation increases, assuming 
other factors are equal, so does the probability of acceptance. These 
facilitating (or inhibiting) factors have traditionally been classified 
as source, message, and receiver variables. Whereas traditional 
theorists have assumed that a manipulation of one of these factors will 
be a sufficient condition for a change in the dependent variable, Fish­
bein and Ajzen maintain that these factors are not influential in and of 
themselves, and that their effects on dependent variable change must be
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viewed in terms of the effect they have on beliefs. Specifically, these 
factors can have one or both of two effects: they can influence the
person's confidence in his own belief, that is, in his proximal proba­
bility; and they can influence the person's judgment that the source 
probability is correct. Furthermore, there is no simple relationship 
between discrepancy and facilitating factors. Therefore, Fishbein and 
Ajzen maintain, in direct contradiction to traditional attitude 
theorists, that a manipulation of a facilitating factor cannot be ex­
pected to have a simple systematic effect on probability of acceptance. 
It follows, then, that the effects of a given message factor on per­
suasion, such as evidence, cannot be unambiguously attributed to that 
factor alone. Instead, they may be due to differences in information 
given to the receivers. Since it has been this relationship that has 
been examined in traditional attitude research, i.e., the effect of 
manipulating a facilitating factor (source, message, or receiver 
variables) on the dependent variable, it is not surprising that the 
literature in communication and persuasion reveals few consistent find­
ings concerning the effects of any given manipulation on "attitude 
change."
Furthermore, Fishbein and Ajzen suggest that these inconsistent 
findings are unavoidable unless more attention is paid to the nature of 
the dependent variable being studied, to the assumptions that link the 
message with the dependent measure of persuasion, to acceptance of 
source beliefs and change in proximal beliefs, and to the impact effects 
of the persuasive communication on external beliefs.
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Statement of the Problem
The major dependent variable in the present investigation was 
whether the subjects, students enrolled in beginning speech courses, 
would sign up to participate in a speech workshop. A second behavior, 
actual attendance at the workshop, was also of interest. The study had 
four purposes! to test the model of behavioral prediction; to determine 
if a persuasive message formulated in accord with Fishbein and Ajzenrs 
basic principles of change would be successful in changing intention to 
participate in and sign up for the speech workshop; to compare 
Fishbein’s principles of change with the Yale approach to changing atti­
tudes and behavior; and, finally, to examine the effect of the use of 
evidence in a persuasive coiranunication.
The theoretical model identified three kinds of variables that 
function as the basic determinants of behavior: attitudes toward per­
formance of the behavior; normative beliefs; and the weights of these 
predictors. A person's attitude toward an object (Ao) will influence 
BI (and thus behavior) if, and only if, it is related to Aact, to NB(Mc), 
or if it influences the relative weights that are placed on these pre­
dictors. Therefore, the following hypotheses were made with respect to 
the model of behavioral prediction:
H-^ : There should be a high positive correlation between
B (signing up for the workshop) and BI (intention to 
sign up for the workshop).
H2: There should be a high positive multiple correlation
between the two predictor components of the model 
(attitude toward signing up for the workshop [Aact] 
and normative social beliefs about whether relevant 
others think they should sign up for the workshop [NB] 
multiplied by their motivation to comply with these 
expectations [Me]) and behavioral intention to sign 
up for the workshop and thus actual sign up behavior.
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H3: Attitude toward speaking (Ao) will be significantly corre­
lated neither to Aact nor to NB(Me).
H^: Since attitude toward speaking (Ao) will correlate with BI,
and thus B, only to the extent that it is correlated with 
one of the two components, then Ao will not be signifi­
cantly correlated to either BI or B.
The second purpose of this study was to determine whether a per­
suasive message formulated in accord with Fishbein and Ajzen's basic 
principles of change was successful in changing subjects' behavioral 
intentions to participate in a speech workshop. Therefore, a persua­
sive message was developed (see Appendix G) which was aimed at changing 
the primary beliefs subjects held with regard to participating in this 
workshop, i.e., those attributes (costs and consequences) which sub­
jects linked with this behavior (participating in the speech workshop).* 
The topic of the communication, therefore, was "signing up for the work­
shop." This persuasive communication was called the "Aact" message, and 
the following hypothesis was made:
H5J Subjects exposed to the Aact message will experience 
significant behavioral intent change while the no­
message group will not.
The third purpose of the present study was to compare Fishbein's 
principles of change with the Yale approach to changing attitudes and 
behavior. Again, the major dependent variable under consideration was 
whether the subjects signed up to participate in the speech workshop. 
Consistent with the Yale research, one approach that might be used by 
researchers to increase sign up behavior would consist of the following: 
1) first, there would be a communication associating speaking with posi­
*These primary beliefs were obtained in a pilot study which was 
conducted previously. See Chapter Two.
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tive consequences {e.g., developing self confidence, being more highly 
regarded by ones peers, becoming a better speaker, etc.) and 2) at the 
end of the comnunication there would be one or more recommendations for 
action, such as "you should speak as often as possible" and/or "you 
should go to the speech workshop." With the preceding approach one 
must assume that changing the subject's attitude toward speaking (Ao) 
will motivate the subjects to sign up to participate in the workshop. 
Fishbein, on the other hand, assumes that if the goal is to persuade 
subjects to sign up for a speaking workshop, then the most efficient 
procedure is to work directly on their attitudes toward signing by 
associating signing up with positive consequences.
In order to compare Fishbein's model of change with the Yale 
model of change, the previously discussed Aact message whose topic was 
"participating in the speech workshop" was compared with another message 
which was developed in accord with the Yale approach (see Appendix G). 
This message was called the Ao (attitude toward the object) message and 
its topic of communication was "speaking at every opportunity." Thus, 
the two messages, Aact and Ao, differed only in the topic of communica­
tion. On the basis of this discussion, the following hypothesis was 
made:
Hg: The Aact message will be significantly more persuasive than
the Ao message.
The fourth and final purpose of this study was to determine what 
effect the use of evidence has in a persuasive communication. In order 
to determine this effect, two additional speeches were formulated by 
adding evidence to the Aact and Ao speeches; these two new speeches were 
designated the "Aacte" and "Aoe" messages (see Appendix G). The opera­
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tional definition of evidence was based on McCroskey's definition of 
that material which is traditionally called evidence, i.e., "third- 
order data" or opinions of others and facts attested to by others 
{McCroskey, 1972, pp. 100-103). Therefore, the Aacte and the Aoe mes­
sages differed from the Aact and Ao messages, respectively, only in 
terms of whether the belief statements in the messages (which were 
identical) were attributed to sources outside the speaker. Using an 
analysis of variance design, the amount of BI change attributable to 
Aact versus Ao was examined, as was the amount of BI change attributable 
to the evidence versus no evidence condition. Therefore, the following 
hypothesis was made:
H?: The amount of BI change attributable to Aact as opposed to
Ao will be significantly greater than the amount of BI 
change attributable to evidence versus no evidence.
The experimental procedure for testing these hypotheses as well as the




As Fishbein and Ajzen indicated in their basic guidelines for 
change, in order for an influence attempt to be effective, it must pro­
duce changes in the salient primary beliefs which underlie the specific 
dependent variable under consideration. Since the dependent variable of 
concern to the present study was beginning speech students' sign up be­
havior to participate in a speech workshop, of immediate concern to the 
present study was the identification of the primary beliefs which under­
lay the specific determinants of intention to sign up.
In their discussion of the procedure which should be used to ob­
tain primary beliefs for a given dependent variable, Fishbein and Ajzen 
suggested that, under most circumstances, a small number of beliefs 
(five to nine) serve as the determinants of any given dependent variable. 
This notion is consistent with previous research on attention span, ap­
prehension, and information processing (Miller, 1956; Woodworth and 
Schlosberg, 1954; Mandler, 1967). Furthermore, Fishbein and Ajzen 
maintained that a person's beliefs about a given action (Aact component) 
can be elicited in a free-response format by asking him to list the con­
sequences or outcomes of performing the behavior in question. Similarly, 
a person's beliefs about social norms (NB[Me] component) can be elicited 
in a free response format by asking the subject to list the people or
33
sets of people whose opinion(s) would influence his decision to perform 
the behavior in question. It has been argued elsewhere (Fishbein,
1967a; Kaplan and Fishbein, 1969) that salient beliefs are elicited 
first, and consistent with the considerations above, beliefs elicited 
beyond the first nine or ten are probably not salient for the individual. 
Therefore, as a general rule of thumb, Fishbein and Ajzen recommended 
that the first five to nine beliefs elicited be used. They continued 
to say that to determine modal salient beliefs for a given population, 
a representative sanple of the population could be asked their beliefs 
about their attitudes toward the behavior and their normative beliefs 
about the behavior. The most frequently elicited beliefs can be con­
sidered the modal salient beliefs for the population (Fishbein and 
Aj2en, 1975, pp. 218-219.). Consistent with these recommendations and 
with previous research (Fishbein, 1963; Kaplan and Fishbein, 1969;
Jaccard and Davidson, 1972), a free elicitation procedure was used to 
determine the modal salient beliefs for Aact and NB(Me).
Because the subjects tested in the present study were under­
graduate students enrolled in beginning public speaking classes, sub­
jects for the pilot research were also drawn from undergraduate public 
speaking classes. Specifically, the sample included forty students en­
rolled in Speech 2060 (Public Speaking) at Louisiana State University 
and fifty-eight students enrolled in Speech 211 (Introduction to Public 
Speaking) at Southeastern Louisiana University. Subjects from both 
schools were used in order to get as valid a list of modal salient be-
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liefs as possible.* The experimental situation was described to the 
subjects (see Appendix A). Following this description the first of two 
questionnaires was distributed. The first questionnaire was designed to 
elicit primary beliefs salient to the Aact cotnponent (see Appendix A) . 
Specifically students were asked to, "List as many consequences/outcomes 
(costs and rewards) as you can of participating in this workshop." On 
the second page of the questionnaire, subjects were asked to evaluate 
the consequences they had listed, and on the third page, belief strength 
was assessed on a probable/improbable scale for each consequence.
Primary beliefs underlying the Aact component for each subject 
were computed in the following manner. If the belief strength with 
which a subject held the behavior consequence link he had listed on 
page one of the questionnaire were marked "slightly probable" to "highly 
probable" by the subject, then the belief was considered salient and in­
cluded on a tally sheet. The tally sheet was divided into "positive 
consequences" and "negative consequences" and beliefs were placed in 
these columns based on the subject's evaluation of the consequences,
i.e., whether he marked the consequence "good" or "bad" on the evalua­
tion scale. After each belief for every subject had been computed and
*It should be noted that these primary beliefs were elicited 
from the pilot subjects about seven weeks into the spring semester, iy/7. 
The experimental sample was treated after having been in class the 
equivalent of three weeks for a regular term. However, when the present 
investigator actually conducted the study, the same free elicitation 
procedure was conducted on a selected number of subjects from the actual 
experimental sample in an effort to validate the modal salient beliefs 
obtained in the pilot research. These subjects were eliminated from the 
experimental sample and were asked to assist in the experiment. The 
list of modal salient beliefs obtained in the pilot sample was essen­
tially the same as the list from the actual experimental sample.
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placed on the tally sheet, the most frequently elicited positive and 
negative beliefs were obtained. These results are shown in Table X. 
Since negative consequences "b" through "e" all seemed to pertain to 
communication apprehension, or "stage fright," they were viewed as one 
belief, i.e., "Participating in this workshop will increase my stage 
fright." Therefore, the final list of modal salient beliefs for the 
Aact component consisted of eight items, six positive consequences and 
two negative consequences. The messages (see Appendix G) which were 
discussed in the Statement of the Problem were based on these eight 
primary beliefs.
The relevant referents for the NB(Me) component were computed 
in the following manner. For each referent listed by a subject, if that 
referent were marked as being "slightly important" to "extremely im­
portant" in determining his decision to go to the workshop, and if the 
subject marked "slightly want to comply" to "very much want to comply" 
with that same referent, then the referent was included on a tally 
sheet. The most frequently elicited relevant referents are listed in 
Table II. These relevant referents were used to assess the normative 
component of the model of behavioral prediction (see Appendix A).
TABLE II
Pilot Study— Relevant Referents Underlying the NB(Mc) Component
a. Instructor c. Close Friends




Pilot Study— Primary Beliefs Underlying the Aact Component
Positive Consequences Negative Consequences
Participating in this workshop Participating in this workshop
will: will:
a. Improve my relationship a. Take up my time
with my instructor
b. Make me nervous
b. Make me a better public
speaker c. Make me embarrassed
c. Allow me to meet new d. Make me feel foolish
people
e. Hurt my ego
d. Give me an advantage
over students who don't 
attend
e. Allow me to get more 
public speaking 
experience
f. Make my instructor think 
I am interested in the 
course and concerned 




The subjects were 125 undergraduate students enrolled In begin­
ning public speaking courses (Speech 211— Introduction to Public Speak­
ing) at Southeastern Louisiana University during the summer semester, 
1977. These subjects represented the entire population of students 
taking beginning public speaking during that semester. The experimental 
period extended over the first three weeks of the University semester 




On the first day of class, subjects were given written informa­
tion about a speech workshop (see Appendix C) sponsored by the Depart­
ment of Speech. This information sheet specified the time and date of 
the "Speech 211 Workshop" which reportedly was being held to allow 
students to evaluate their speaking ability with that of students in 
other sections of the course. Attendance was said to be voluntary, and 
students were informed that whether they elected to attend or not would 
affect their grades in the class in no way. If the student elected to 
attend, however, he would be requested to give a sixty-second speech of 
self-introduction to the group. The information sheet also stated that 
the instructors of the classes would be present at the workshop. The 
instructors of the classes, who served as confederates (see Appendix B), 
also administered a general questionnaire disguised as a normal, first- 
day classroom procedure, included in which was a measure of the sub-
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jects' attitudes toward speaking (Ao). (See Appendix D.)
Step B
One week later, the instructors administered another question­
naire under the guise of trying to determine the number of possible par­
ticipants at the workshop. This questionnaire was actually a pretest 
measure of the following:
1. Subjects' behavioral intentions (BI) with respect to signing 
up for the workshop. (See Appendix E, question 1.)
2. Subjects' attitudes toward signing up for the workshop 
(Aact), toward speaking (Ao), and toward not signing up for 
the workshop (Aactn-s). (See Appendix E, questions 2-4.)
3. Subjects' normative beliefs for each referent (NB) with 
respect to the act of signing and with respect to speaking. 
(See Appendix E, questions 5-12.)
4. Subjects' motivation to comply (Me) with their perception 
of what significant others think they should do, (See 
Appendix E, questions 13-16.)
Stage II: Treatment
Six days after the pretest, on the day preceding the scheduled 
workshop, subjects were randomly assigned to one of five conditions con­
sisting of four experimental groups and one control group. At this 
point, the control subjects were given the posttest and sign up instru­
ments, that is, they proceeded directly to Stage III. Each of the four 
experimental groups, however, heard one of the following oral persuasive 
messages presented by a live speaker: 1) the Aact message; 2) the Aacte
message; 3) the Ao message; or 4) the Aoe message. (See Appendix G.) 
Each speech contained the same eight modal salient beliefs determined 
from the pilot research. The Aact messages differed from the Ao mes­
sages in the topic of communication, i.e., "speaking at every opportu-
40
nity" versus "signing up for the speech workshop." The evidence mes­
sages differed from the no evidence messages only in that the belief 
statements in them were attributed to sources outside the speaker her­
self. The speaker was a female doctoral candidate in speech, with ex­
tensive public speaking and teaching experience and the author of this 
work. Having been introduced in the information sheet as a faculty mem­
ber from another university and director of the workshop, she delivered 
the memorized messages in as uniform a manner as possible.
Stage III: Posttesting
Immediately after hearing the speech, subjects in each condition 
were asked to fill out a two-part Opinion Questionnaire and a two-part 
Belief Inventory.
Two-part Opinion Questionnaire
Part I of this instrument was identical to the pretest and 
measured the following:
1. Subjects’ behavioral intentions (BI) with respect to signing 
up for the workshop. {See Appendix F, question 1.)
2. Subjects' attitudes toward signing, speaking, and not sign­
ing. (See Appendix F, questions 2-4.)
3. Subjects' normative beliefs for each referent (NB) with 
respect to signing and with respect to speaking. (See 
Appendix F, questions 5-12.)
4. Subjects' motivation to comply {He) with their perceptions 
of what significant others think they should do. (See 
Appendix F, questions 13-16.)
Part II of this instrument was the sign up sheet for partici­
pating in the workshop. (See Appendix F.) Subjects were told that, al­
though participating in the workshop was voluntary and not a course re-
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quirement, the sign up sheet was a commitment and that the names would 
be checked at the workshop.
Two-part Belief Inventory
Part I of this instrument assessed the component, i.e., it 
was used to determine the extent to which subjects agreed or disagreed 
with the source statements (behavior-consequence links) made in the mes­
sages. (See Appendix F.) Part II assessed the A^ component, i.e., the 
subjects' evaluations of the behavior consequence links made in the mes­
sages. (See Appendix F.)
Stage IV: "Speech 211 Workshop"
The workshop was conducted as scheduled. Those who attended 
were asked to sign a roll, thus actual participation was considered 
behavior 2. The experimenter conducted the workshop, which began with 
a complete debriefing of the subjects. Following a question period, the 
workshop was conducted as advertised. Instructors debriefed non­
attendees in their classes on the following day. Participants in the 
workshop reported that the pretest, treatment, and posttest had been 
unobtrusive. At no point did they know that they were participating in 
an experiment. Furthermore, those who attended felt that the workshop 
had been a beneficial experience.
Chapter 3
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In the model of behavioral intent, both predictor variables, 
i.e., Aact and NB(Mc), taken together should be significant predictors 
of the criterion variable, i.e., BI. In many instances, however, one of 
the two components may be a better predictor of BI. In such instances, 
persuasive attempts must be directed at the component which is the 
better predictor. Therefore, immediately following the pretest, the 
multiple linear regression statistic was used to determine whether Aact 
or NB(Mc) were, indeed, significant predictors of BI and, second, to 
determine which, if either, was the better predictor. The findings in­
dicated that both Aact and NB(Me) were significant predictors of BI at 
the .0001 level (F = 11.00). However the Aact component was the better 
of the two predictors, significant at the .0001 level (F * 16.27, beta 
weight = .37), while NB{Mc) was significant at the .0184 level (F - 
5.72, beta weight = .02). The persuasive messages, therefore, were 
directed at the Aact component.
Each hypothesis in the study was tested statistically using an 
IBM 370/158 and employing the SAS'76 correlational, analysis of variance, 
and general linear models procedures. Furthermore, although no hypothe­
ses were made with respect to the second behavior (B2), actual attend­
ance at the workshop, a measure was obtained for this variable, and 
several additional statistical tests were run using this variable.
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Where appropriate, these results have been included. Before discussing 
the findings, specific results for each hypothesis will be noted.
Results
Hypothesis 1: There should be a high positive correlation be­
tween B and BI* The hypothesis was confirmed. Using point biserial 
correlation, the findings revealed a positive correlation between the 
pretest measure of BI and B significant at the .0001 level (it = .40) and 
between the posttest measure of BI and B significant at the .0001 level 
(r = .70). The results of these and other correlational statistics are 
shown in Table III.
Hypothesis 2: There should be a high multiple correlation be­
tween the two predictor components of the model, Aact and NB(Me), and 
BI. This hypothesis was confirmed. The findings revealed that pretest 
Aact and NB(Mc) were positively correlated with pretest BI, significant 
at the .0001 level (R - .40). Furthermore, posttest BI was signifi­
cantly correlated with posttest Aact and NB(Mc) at the .0165 level 
(R = .265).
Hypothesis 3s Attitude toward speaking (Ao) will not be signi­
ficantly correlated to Aact nor to HB{Mc). This hypothesis was not con­
firmed. Using Pearson's r_, the findings revealed that Ao was signifi­
cantly correlated with pretest Aact at the .0066 level (£ = .25182) and 
with pretest NB(Mc) at the .0008 level (_r = .30784). While Ao was not 
significantly correlated with posttest Aact (r = .14359), it was signi­
ficantly correlated with posttest NB(Mc) at the .0226 level (r^  = .2252).
Hypothesis 4i Ao will not be significantly correlated to BI or 
to B. This hypothesis was partially confirmed. Using Pearson's r, the
TABLE H I
Correlations
Pretest Pretest Posttest Posttest Posttest Behavior! Behav.2t Aact— Not 
NB(Mc) BI Aact NB(Mc) BI (sign up) (attend.) Signing Ao
Pretest Aact .32* .35* .34* .25* .08 .17** .11 .84* .25*
Pretest NB(Mc) .31* .29* .67* .05 .03 .04 .39* .31*
Pretest BI .34* .16 .53* .40* .22* .30* .32*
Posttest Aact .48* .27* .27* ,14 .90* .14
Posttest NB(He) .11 .17** .01 .39* .21*
Posttest BI .70* .50* .02 .25*
Bt (sign up) .15 .06
B2t (attending) .09 .05
Aact— Not Signing .30*
tPoint Biserial Correlation 





findings indicated a significant correlation at the .0006 level between 
Ao and pretest BI (r =* .31662) and a significant correlation at the 
.0069 level (£ “ .25072) between Ao and posttest BI. However, the point 
biserial correlation between Ao and B was not significant (£ = .0611). 
Just as the point biserial was not significant for the sign up behavior 
(B), neither was it significant for actual attendance at the workshop 
(B2) <r = .0492).
Hypothesis 5: Subjects exposed to the Aact message will exper­
ience significant BI change while the no message group will not. This 
hypothesis was confirmed. Using analysis of variance, the findings 
revealed a significant difference in change in BI between groups re­
ceiving the Aact message and the no message group, that is, the amount 
of BI change attributable to Aact was significant at the .0009 level 
(F = 11.97).
Since hypotheses 6 and 7 were tested in the same procedure, the 
findings will be discussed together.
Hypothesis 6 : The Aact message will be significantly more per­
suasive than the Ao message. This hypothesis was not confirmed.
Hypothesis 7: The amount of BI change attributable to Aact as
opposed to Ao will be significantly greater than the amount of BI change 
attributable to evidence versus no evidence. This hypothesis was not 
confirmed. Using analysis of variance, the findings revealed that:
1) the Aact messages were not significantly more persuasive than the Ao 
messages (F = 2.48)f 2) the evidence messages were not significantly 
more persuasive than the no evidence messages (F^ m 1.18); and 3) the 
amount of change in BI due to Aact as opposed to Ao was not signifi­
cantly different from the amount of change in BI due to evidence versus
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no evidence (F - 1.83). These results are shown in Table IV.
Discussion
In considering the foregoing results, the reader should keep two 
things in mind. First, because the experimental sample consisted of 
undergraduate speech students, the generalizability of the findings must 
be restricted, even though the age range of the sample was from seven­
teen to fifty-five years of age. Second, in considering the hypotheses 
which were confirmed, one should keep in mind the large number of sub­
jects in the sample (N = 115) and the effect this had upon the extremely 
high levels of confidence obtained.
The two hypotheses specifically concerning the theory itself 
were confirmed. It will be recalled from Chapter 1 that Fishbein and 
Ajzen maintained that by knowing a person's behavioral intentions, one 
could accurately predict specific, single act behaviors. They further 
asserted that if one knew a person's attitude toward performing the 
behavior as well as his normative social beliefs about what relevant 
others expected him to do with respect to that behavior, then one could 
predict the behavioral intentions of that person. The present investi­
gation lends support to these notions as evidenced by the pre- and 
posttest correlations between B and BI, as well as by the pre- and 
posttest correlations between Aact, NB(Mc), and BI. Furthermore, the 
findings revealed that for this specific behavior— signing up for a 
speech workshop— the Aact component was the better predictor of inten­
tion. This finding suggests that if one wants to encourage people to 
participate in person-to-group speaking situations, perhaps he should 
concentrate on the person's attitude toward the behavior rather than on
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TABLE IV








ANA 1 7.41 7.41 2.48
ENE 1 3. 52 3.52 1.18
ANA x ENE 2 10.93 5.47 1.83
Error 80 238.59 2.98
p < .01
ANA - Attitude toward the Act (Aact) versus attitude toward the
Object (Ao)
ENE - Evidence versus no evidence
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his normative social beliefs. The implications of this finding for 
teachers of public speaking deserve further attention and research.
The confirmation of Hypotheses 1 and 2 has additional implica­
tions for the so-called "attitude/behavior dichotomy." Because of the 
inconsistent findings in the attitude literature and because no con­
sistent relationship between attitude and behavior has emerged from pre­
vious research, several investigators (e.g., wicker, 1969; McGuire,
1969) have questioned the traditionally assumed relationship between 
attitude and behavior. The findings of the present investigation lend 
support to the assumed relationship between attitude and behavior, if 
certain of Fishbein and Ajzen's assumptions are met, e.g., that the in­
dependent and dependent variables are measured at the same level of 
specificity, that the time lapse between measurement of B and BI is not 
so long that other variables might intervene, etc.
A note should be added to this discussion of the findings con­
cerning the theory in general. First, although the relationship was not 
hypothesized, the correlation between attitude toward performing the 
behavior and attitude toward not performing the behavior, according to 
Fishbein and Ajzen, should be highly correlated. The findings of the 
present investigation also lend support to this notion. Using Pearson's 
r_, the results revealed that attitude toward signing up for the workshop 
(Aact) and attitude toward not signing up (Aactn-s) were correlated sig­
nificantly at the .0001 level (1: • .83782). The second consideration 
involves the relationship between B (signing up for the workshop) and 
B2 (attendance at the workshop). While thirty-six people signed up, 
only nineteen people actually attended the workshop.
An explanation of the findings for Hypotheses 3 through 7 can
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best be done by considering these hypotheses together. In general, the 
predicted relationships for these hypotheses were not confirmed. Sub­
jects* attitudes toward the object (Ao)— speaking at every opportunity—  
were significantly correlated with the model's two components, Aact and 
MB(Me) pretest, and NB(Me) posttest as well as with the predictor 
variable BI. Furthermore, while Hypothesis 5 was confirmed, i.e., that 
the subjects who heard the Aact messages would experience significant BI 
change while the no message group would not, it is of prime importance 
to note that the subjects who heard the Ao messages also experienced 
significant BI change compared to the no message group (P <_ .0256, F^ = 
5.20), although not as much as the subjects who heard the Aact messages. 
Furthermore, the analysis of variance procedure revealed that the amount 
of intent change attributable to the Aact messages as opposed to the Ao 
messages was not significant, nor was the amount of intent change attri­
butable to the evidence/no evidence speeches. In other words, all four 
speeches produced a significant amount of intent change. These findings 
can be explained, at least partially, in terms of the theory.
Fishbein and Ajzen maintained that Ao would be related to BI 
only to the extent that it was related to one of the model's two com­
ponents. As was stated previously, in the present investigation sub­
jects' attitudes toward speaking at every opportunity (Ao) were signi­
ficantly correlated with Aact, with NB(Mc) and with BI. The implication 
of these correlations for the four treatment messages and the signifi­
cant amount of change which all four produced in BI is important. 
Fishbein and Ajzen would probably maintain that since Ao was correlated 
with the two predictor components as well as with BI then, at least for 
this behavior, the primary beliefs which underlie Ao quite probably are
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the same primary beliefs which underlie Aact. Therefore, significant 
change in BI would be expected for all four messages. It is conceivable 
that this finding may give insight into some of the apparent incon­
sistencies in previous research. Where this research found significant 
relationships between Ao and B, it may have been because the same 
beliefs underlay both Ao and Aact. Where previous research found no 
relationship between Ao and B, it may have been because the beliefs 
which underlay Ao and Aact were different.
Suggestions for Further Research
The findings of the present investigation lend support to 
Fishbein and Ajzen*s model of prediction for single-act behaviors. How­
ever, more empirical research is needed before a complete statement can 
be made about the theory itself. Also deserving of more attention is 
the idea that the Aact component was more important, for this type of 
speaking behavior. These findings should be of interest to teachers of 
public speaking. Furthermore the relationship between the two related 
behaviors, B and b2, was an interesting one. Only one-half of the sub­
jects who performed the first behavior actually attended the workshop. 
Although a relationship between B and B2 was not hypothesized, nor was 
it examined statistically in this study, it would be revealing to 
examine this type of relationship. In this case, the sign up behavior 
was not a very good predictor of actual attendance.
Obviously the relationship between amount of change of intent 
and Aact versus Ao messages as well as between evidence versus no evi­
dence messages needs to be re-examined in a study in which Ao is not 
significantly correlated with the components of the model. No state-
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ment may be made as to the persuasive efficacy of the use of evidence in 
terms of this study, however, this concept needs to be re-examined in 
order to determine, first, if Fishbein and Ajzen*s principles of change 
are accurate and, secondly, to determine if the manipulation of a mes­
sage variable such as evidence can have a systematic effect on attitude 
and subsequent behavior change.
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APPENDIX A
PILOT RESEARCH
Instructions to Subjects in the Pilot Research 
Subjects were urged to be as thoughtful and honest as possible. 
They were asked to imagine themselves as they were on the first day of 
class and to put themselves into a hypothetical situation. Specifically 
they were told:
Imagine that on the first day of your speech class your 
instructor gave you an information sheet about a speech workshop, 
for all beginning speech students, which would be held in approx­
imately three weeks at a specified date, time and place. The 
primary purposes of the workshop, according to the information 
sheet, would be to give you a chance to evaluate yourselves in 
terms of other beginning speech students and to give you some 
outside advice and help with your speaking problems. The infor­
mation sheet also tells you that the workshop will be informal 
and that the instructors of all the beginning speech classes 
will be there, although no credit will be given, nor will par­
ticipation or failure to participate affect your grade in this 
class. Approximately ten days later, your instructor asks you 
if you will participate in the workshop. Now, based on this 
information, decide whether you would or would not participate 
in the workshop.
After the subjects had had time to make their decisions, the first ques-
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tionnaire, designed to assess the primary beliefs underlying the Aact 
component, was distributed. Subjects were told:
Based on the decision you made, complete the following 
questionnaire in terms of the reasons underlying that decision, 
that is, if you decided to participate, what were your reasons 
for doing so, and vice versa. You do not have to list as many 
reasons as there are numbers listed. We are interested only in 
your honest beliefs about the consequences {costs and rewards 
you perceive) of participating in this workshop. Assume that 
the phrase "Participating in this workshop will . . .” precedes 
each consequence that you list.
After subjects had completed this sheet, two other pages, designed to 
assess their attitudes toward the workshop and their levels of belief 
strength, were distributed. The meaning and the mechanics of filling 
out each scale were esqplained. Subjects then proceeded to evaluate each 
consequence they had listed as well as to indicate how strongly they 
believed each of the consequences was actually associated with the be­
havior.
Upon completion of the Aact questionnaire, subjects were given 
the first page of the questionnaire designed to assess the relevant 
referents for the NB(Mc) component. Subjects were asked to list those 
people, if any, whose opinions would influence their decisions to parti­
cipate or not participate. When the subjects had finished this page, 
three other pages were given to them along with the following instruc­
tions :
Now that you have listed those people whose opinions might 
influence your decision to participate or not to participate,
we would like some additional information. On page two, please 
indicate whether you think the people you listed believe you 
ought to go to this workshop. On page three indicate how im­
portant each person's opinion is to you, and on the fourth sheet 
indicate how motivated you are to do what these people want you 
to do.
Upon completion of the two questionnaires, the subjects were thanked for 
their cooperation, and the study was described to those who were inter­
ested.
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Assessment of Primary Beliefs for the Aact Component
List as many consequences/outcomes (costs and rewards) as you can of par­


















For each consequence you listed, indicate your evaluation of that conse­
quence on the appropriate scale below by placing a check mark IA in the 
position which most closely reflects your evaluation of that consequence. 
For example, consequence number 1 will be rated on the scale numbered 
"1”; consequence number 2 will be rated on the scale numbered "2"; etc.
1.__good ________:_______ :________ :_______:_______ i________:_______  bad
2.__good ________:_______ :________ :_______:_______ s________:_______  bad
3.__good ________:_______ :________ :_______:_______ t________:_______  bad
4._good ________:_______ :________ :_______*_______ :________s_______  bad
5._good ________:_______ :________ :_______s_______ :________:_______  bad
6.__good ________:_______ :________ :_______:_______ :________: bad
7. good _______:_______ s________ :_______ :_______ : :_______  bad
8. good _______:_______ :________ :________: :_______ :_______  bad
9. good _______:_______ :________ s_______ :_______:_______ :_______  bad
10. good _______:_______ s________ :_______ :_______i_______ :_______  bad
11. good _______:_______ :________ s_______ :_______i_______ :_______  bad
12. good _______:_______ :________ :_______ :_______:_______ :_______  bad
13. good _______!_______ !________ :_______ :_______:_______ :_______  bad
14. good _______:_______ :________ :_______ :_______:_______ :_______  bad
15. good _______:_______ :________ :_______ :_______:_______ :_______  bad
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For each consequence you listed, indicate how strongly you believe {that 
is, how probable you think it is) that each of the consequences you 
listed is, indeed, a consequence of participating in this workshop. Rate 
consequence number 1 on the first scale (number 1); consequence number 2 
on the second scale (number 2); and so on. Place a check {/) in the 
position which most closely reflects the strength with which you hold 
this belief.
1._probable _____ :_______ :______ :______ :______ :______ i______ improbable
2._probable _____ :_______ :______ :______ :______ :______ :______ improbable
3._probable _____ :_______ :______ :______ :______ :______ :______ improbable
4. probable _____ :_______ :______ s______ :______ :______ :______ improbable
5._probable _____ ;_______ :______ :______ :______ :______ :______ improbable
6._probable _____ :_______ :______ i______ s______ j______ !______ improbable
7. probable _____ :_______s______ s_______:______!______ :______  improbable
8. probable _____ : ; ;_______:______:______ :______  improbable
9 . probable _____ :_______*______ :_______:______:______ :______  improbable
10. probable _____ :_______:______ :_______j______i______ ; improbable
11. probable ;______ :______ : ;______:______ :______  improbable
12. probable ;______ ;______ :_______:______:______ : improbable
13._probable _____ :_______:______ :_______:______:______ :______  improbable
14._probable ______; :______ :_______:______:______ :______  improbable
15._probable _____ :_______:______ :_______:______:______ :______  improbable
16._probable _____ :______ :______ ;_______:______:______ :______  improbable
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Assessment of Relevant Referents for the NB(Me) Component
List as many people or sets of people (relevant referents) as you can 
whose opinion(a) would influence your decision as to whether you would 















For each person or set of persons named, indicate what you think they 
think you should do with regard to participating in this workshop by 
placing a check (/) in the blank which most closely reflects your feel­
ings. Number 1 on the list of people should correspond to scale num­
ber 1 on this questionnaire. For example:
 expects me to participate in this workshop.
(whomever you listed as no. 1)
probable ______ :  :_______: / :______ :______ :______  improbable
1. probable ______:______ :______ :______ :______ :______ :______  improbable
2. probable ______ :______ :______ :______ :______ :______ :______  improbable
3. probable ______:______ :______ :______ :______ :______ :______  improbable
4. probable ______ :______ :______ :______ :______ :______ :______  improbable
5. probable ______:______ :______ :______ :______ :______ :______  improbable
6. probable ______ :______ :______ :______ :______ :______ :______  improbable
7. probable ______:______ :______ :______ :______ :______ :______  improbable
8 . probable ______:______ :______ :______ :______ :______ :______  improbable
9. probable ______:______ :______ :______ :______ :______ :______  improbable
10. probable ______:______ :______ :______ : : :______  improbable
11. probable ______:______ :______ :______ :______ :______ :______  improbable
12. probable ______:______ :______ :______ :______ :______ :______  improbable
13. probable ______:______ :______ :______ :______ :______ :______  improbable
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For each person or set of persons, indicate how important that person or 
set of persons is (are) in determining your decision to participate in 
this workshop by placing a check (/) in the blank which most closely re­
flects your feelings. Number 1 on the previous questionnaire should 
correspond to scale number 1 on this questionnaire.
extremely not important
1. important _____:_____ :_____ :_____ i_____ :_____ :_____  at all
extremely not important
2. important _______:______:_____ :_____ :_____ :_____ :____  at all
extremely not important
3. important _______:______ :_____ ;_____ :_____ :_____ :____  at all
extremely not important
4. important _______:______:_____ t_____ :_____ j_____ :____  at all
extremely not important
5. important _______:______:_____ :_____ :_____ :_____ :_____ at all
extremely not important
6. important _______:______:_____ :_____ :_____ :_____ :_____ at all
extremely not important
7. important _______;______s_____ :_____ t_____ :_____ :_____ at all
extremely not important
8. important _______:______t_____ s_____ :_____ :_____ :_____ at all
extremely not important
9. important ______ :______:_____ :_____ :_____ :_____ :_____ at all
extremely not important
10. important ______ :______:_____ :_____ :_____ :_____ :_____ at all
extremely not important
11. important ______ :______:_____ :_____ :_____ t_____ t_____ at all
extremely not important
12. important ______ :______s_____ :_____ :_____ :_____ :_____ at all
extremely not important
13. important ______ :______:_____ :_____ :_____ •_____ :_____ at all
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For each person or set of persons named, indicate how much you want to 
comply with their expectations about your participating in this workshop 
by placing a check (/) in the blank which most closely reflects your 
feelings. Number 1 on the list of people should correspond to scale 
number 1 on this questionnaire. For example:
How much do you want to do what  expects you










want very want very
1. much to • ■ ; : i s much not to
want very want very
2. much to : : : : • t much not to
want very want very
3. much to • ■ : • *■ I much not to
want very want very
4. much to •■ •* •• * * much not to
want very want very
5. much to •■ • ** »* * • much not to
want very want very
6. much to : ** *• *• * : much not to
want very want very
7. much to ** A • • s ; much not to
want very want very
8. much to • * : s * : much not to
want very want very
9. much to : : : * S much not to
want very want very
10. much to • s : : : •* much not to
want very want very
11. much to •* *• ; : * • much not to
want very want very
12. much to : : : : ** * much not to
want very want very
13. much to : : : : : :  much not to
APPENDIX B
GUIDELINES AND INFORMATION FOR CONFEDERATES (INSTRUCTORS)
Guidelines
I. With respect to the general methodology, there are two vital ele­
ments which relate to the participation of the confederates (in­
structors) :
A. Uniformity of information— in response to students' inevitable 
questions about the workshop, the instructors must give the 
same information; and,
B. Authenticity of the situation— excepting the experimenter and 
the confederates, everyone involved must think that the work­
shop and its attendant measures are real, and the experimental 
nature of the project must be concealed.
II. With respect to the specific information which confederates will 
give:
A. Generally, be vague but interested— as the cover story sug­
gests, we (the instructors) are interested in the results of 
the workshop, but we are more or less waiting to find out 
exactly how it will be conducted.
B. Regarding questions about the workshop itself, it will be;
1. Informal;
2. Voluntary;
3. Without grades or instructors' critiques;
4. Attended by instructors and 211 students; and,
5* Not a factor in the grading of the course.
C. The speech which every attendee will give will be:
1. A sixty-second speech of self-introduction;
2. Presented in front of the entire group;
3. Done with or without notes and a podium, as the student
wishes;
4. Similar to or possibly the same as the introductory speech 
done in class; and,
5. Possibly worthy of an extra practice or two.
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III. With respect to your participation, I am extremely grateful and 
will try to minimize your trouble in every way possible. I will 
be at school for each of the early questionnaire days and will take 
care of getting the instruments to you and picking them up after 
each class, or in whatever manner you prefer. The treatment day 
will be moderately confusing, but I hope to make it as easy on 
everyone as I can. Thanks a lot.
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Confederate Information Form
I. The purpose of the study is to predict, according to Fishbein and
Ajzen’s theory of behavior, whether, depending upon certain re­
ceiver and message criteria:
A. Beginning speech students will intend to perform a certain
public speaking behavior; and, whether
B. Those intentions can be changed by an oral persuasive message.
II. The experiment will consist of four general stages:
A. Stage One— preliminary instruments:
1. A basic information sheet about the workshop handed out by 
instructors to all 211 students during the first days of 
class. Instructors should answer students' questions gen­
erally, according to the accompanying guidelines; and,
2. Receiver criteria survey administered to all students, be­
ginning on the first or second day of class. Instructors 
will explain that these instruments are routinely admini­
stered to beginning speech students as part of the course.
3. Both of these preliminary instruments should be given to
late registrants, etc., in order to maximize the eventual
number of subjects in the study.
B. Stage Two— experimental pretest:
1. A brief questionnaire relating to subjects' intentions to 
participate in the workshop; and,
2. A brief questionnaire relating to subjects' attitudes 
toward speaking in general.
C. Stage Three— treatment day:
1. Instructors will conduct class as usual, but will not hear 
speeches.
2. In four shifts, class members will be taken to another 
room, where they will hear a persuasive message and indi­
cate whether they will participate in the workshop.
Students will not return to the classroom but will be dis­
missed after the treatment.
3. The fifth shift of the treatment will be administered in 
the classroom.
D. Stage Four— the workshop. Experimenters will debrief and thank
subjects. The workshop will be conducted as described.
APPENDIX C
SUBJECT INFORMATION SHEET
Because students in basic public speaking classe3 often want to 
know how their speaking compares, not only to their fellow classmates' 
but to members of other sections as well, several college and universi­
ties have conducted "speech workshops"— informal meetings in which 
students get to see how their colleagues' speaking compares to their own. 
These voluntary, ungraded sessions have proved successful in many 
schoois.
To see if SLU speech students would benefit from this kind of 
program, the Department of Speech and Theatre will sponsor a "Speech 211 
Workshop" to be held at 2:00 P.M. on Thursday, June 16, in room 141 of 
the Humanities Building.
Those who come to the workshop will deliver a brief (sixty- 
seconds) speech of self introduction similar to the first speech you will 
do in class during the first week. Although the 211 teachers 
(Dr. Welford, Dr. Woodard, and Mrs. Borden) will be attending the work­
shop, whether you do or do not wish to come and speak will not affect
your grade in the class.
An instructor from the Speech Department at Louisiana State Uni­
versity, who has directed similar programs at other universities, will 
organize and conduct the workshop. She will be passing around a sign up 
sheet in your class prior to the workshop.
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APPENDIX D
STUDENT INFORMATION AND ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE
Student Information Questionnaire
In order to obtain an overall profile on the students taking Speech 211,
I would like for you to provide the following information about yourself:
Name:______________________________________________________________________
Social Security N u m b e r __________________________________________________
Sex (check one): Male _____  Female______
Age:_______________________________________________________________________
College Classification (circle one):
Freshman Sophomore Junior Senior Graduate




None 1/2 a year 1 year 2 years more than two years 
None 1/2 a year 1 year 2 years more than two years
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Student Attitude Questionnaire
I would like to know what the concepts "speaking" and "being a good pub­
lic speaker" mean to you personally. Therefore, I want you to judge and 
rate these two terms on a set of twelve descriptive scales listed on the 
following two pages. Here is how you use the scales:
If you feel that "speaking," for example, is very closely related or 
extremely related to one end of the scale, you should place your check 
as shown below:
fair ____ /____:_____ :________ :_______ :________ :_____ :__________  unfair
extremely quite slightly neutral slightly quite extremely
A few of the scales given on the following two pages may not seem to 
really apply or relate to what is being rated. For example, you may not 
think of "speaking” as being something which could be called either fair 
or unfair. If you really feel that a particular scale does not relate 
at all to what is being judged, mark the middle or neutral position. 
However, in most cases after thinking a second or two, you will be able 
to see that what is being judged does relate at least slightly or 
vaguely either to one side or the other of the scale.
Important points to remember:
1. Place your check in the middle of spaces, not on the boundaries:
/
, i • • a/ * *
* i i * » * •
THIS NOT THIS
2. Be sure you check every scale for both concepts. Don't omit any.
3. Never put more than one check on a scale.
Speaking
safe ______ :______ :______ :______ :______ :______ :______  dangerous
hopeless ______ :______ :______ :______ :______ i______ s______  hopeful
tasty ______ !______ :______ :______ :______ !______ :______  distasteful
good ______ :______ :______ :______ :______ :______ :______  bad
foolish : : : s : : wise
dirty _____  :______ :______ s______ :__ :______ :______  clean
strong _______:_______ :_______t_______:_______ ••_______ :_______ weak
important _______s________:_______ :_______ s_______ j_______ :_______ unimportant
painful ______ :______ :______ :______ :______ :______ i______  pleasurable
useful : : : : :  : useless
attracting ______ :______ :_______:______ :______ :______ :______ repelling
right _______:_______ i_______ :_______:_______ :_______:______  wrong
Being a Good Public Speaker
safe _____:_______ :_______ :_______j_______ :_______ :________ dangerous
hopeless ______ :______ :______ :______ :______ :______ :______  hopeful
tasty ______:_______:______ :______ :______ :______ ;______  distasteful
good ______:_______:______ :______ :______ :______ :______ bad
foolish :______ :__ :  :  :_______:______ wise
dirty ______ :_______ :______ :______ :______ *______:______  clean
strong ______ :_______ :______ :______ :______ »______:______  weak
important ______ :_______ :______ :______ :______ :______:______  unimportant
painful ______ :_______ :______ :______ :______ s______s______  pleasurable
useful :  :  :   : s •   useless
attracting _______:_______ :_______ :_______ s_______ j_______ :_______  repelling
right _______:_______ :_______ :_______:_______ :_______ :_______  wrong
APPENDIX E
PRETEST QUESTIONNAIRE
In order 1) to determine the probable attendance at the Speech Workshop and 2) to assess your attitudes in 
general about the Workshop, we would appreciate your filling out the following survey. Please answer every 
question by placing an "X" in the blank which most closely reflects your feelings.
1. How likely is it that you will sign up for the Speech Workshop?
extremely quite slightly undecided slightly quite extremely
unlikely unlikely unlikely likely likely likely
2. Do you think that signing up for the Speech Workshop is:
an extremely a bad thing a slightly undecided about whether a slightly a good thing an extremely
bad thing to do bad thing "signing up" is good or good thing to do good thing
to do to do bad to do to do
3. Do you think that speaking is:
an extremely a bad thing a slightly undecided about whether a slightly a good thing an extremely
bad thing to do bad thing "speaking" is good or good thing to do good thing
to do to do bad to do to do
CD
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4. Do you think that not signing up for the Speech Workshop is:
an extremely a bad thing a slightly undecided about whether a slightly a good thing an extremely
bad thing to do bad thing "not signing up" is good thing to do good thing
to do to do good or bad to do to do
5. My instructor thinks that I :  :  :  speak when given the opportunity.
definitely probably probably definitely 
should not should not should should
OR
My instructor doesn't care whether I speak 
when given the opportunity cr not.
6. My instructor thinks that I__________ :  :  :  sign up for the Speech Workshop.
definitely probably probably definitely 
should not should not should should
OR
My instructor doesn't care whether I sign up 
for the Speech Workshop or not.
7. My classmates think that I __________ :  :  :  speak when given the opportunity.
definitely probably probably definitely
should not should not should should
OR
My classmates don't care whether I speak 
when given the opportunity or not.
8. My classmates think that I __________ :  :  :  sign up for the Speech Workshop.
definitely probably probably definitely 
should not should not should should
OR
My classmates don't care whether I sign up 
for the Speech Workshop or not.
9. My close friends think that I__________:__________ :________:__________speak when given the opportunity.
definitely probably probably definitely 
should not should not should should
OR
My close friends don’t care whether I 
speak when given the opportunity or not.
00K)
10. My close friends think that 1__________:__________:________ :__________ sign up for the Speech Workshop.
definitely probably probably definitely
should not should not should should
OR
My close friends don't care whether I sign 
up for the Speech Workshop or not.
boyfriend/girlfriend
11. My husband/wife thinks that I__________:__________ :________ :__________speak when given the opportunity.
definitely probably probably definitely 
should not should not should should
OR
boyfriend/girlfriend 
My husband/wife doesn't care whether
I speak when given the opportunity or not.
boyfriend/girlfriend
12. My husband/wife thinks that I__________ :__________:________; sign up for the Speech Workshop.
definitely probably probably definitely 
should not should not should should
OR
boyfriend/girlfriend 
My husband/wife doesn't care whether
I sign up for the Speech Workshop or not. m
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13. Doing what your instructor thinks you should do is:
extremely bad quite bad slightly bad undecided slightly good quite good extremely good





extremely bad quite bad slightly bad undecided slightly good quite good extremely good
Doing what your close friends think you should do is:
* • 
* •
extremely bad quite bad slightly bad undecided slightly good quite good extremely good









Survey and Opinion Questionnaire
In order 1) to determine the probable attendance at the Speech Workshop and 2) to assess your attitudes in 
general about the Workshop, we would appreciate your filling out the following survey. Please answer every 
question by placing an "X" in the blank which most closely reflects your feelings.
1. How likely is it that you will sign up for the Speech Workshop?
extremely quite slightly undecided slightly quite extremely
unlikely unlikely unlikely likely likely likely









undecided about whether 










3. Do you think that speaking is:
an extremely a bad thing a slightly undecided about whether a slightly a good thing an extremely
bad thing to do bad thing "speaking" is good or good thing to do good thing
to do to do bad to do to do
a>Ln
4. Do you think that not signing up for the Speech Workshop is:
an extremely a bad thing a slightly undecided about whether
bad thing to do bad thing "not signing up" is
to do to do good or bad
a slightly a good thing 





5. My instructor thinks that I speak when given the opportunity.
definitely probably probably definitely 
should not should not should should
OR
My instructor doesn't care whether I speak 
when given the opportunity or not.
definitely probably probably definitely 
should not should not should should
OR
My instructor doesn't care whether I sign up 
for the Speech Workshop or not.
6. My instructor thinks that 1 sign up for the Speech Workshop
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7. My classmates think that I __________ :  :  :  speak when given the opportunity.
definitely probably probably definitely
should not should not should should
OR
My classmates don't care whether I speak 
when given the opportunity or not.
8. My classmates think that I __________ :  :  :  sign up for the Speech Workshop.
definitely probably probably definitely 
should not should not should should
OR
My classmates don't care whether I sign up 
for the Speech Workshop or not.
9. My close friends think that I__________:__________ :________ :__________speak when given the opportunity.
definitely probably probably definitely 
should not should not should should
OR
My close friends don't care whether I 
speak when given the opportunity or not.
CD
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10. My close friends think that I__________:__________ :________ :__________sign up for the Speech Workshop.
definitely probably probably definitely
should not should not should should
OR
My close friends don’t care whether I sign 
up for the Speech Workshop or not.
boyfriend/girlfriend
11. My husband/wife thinks that 1__________:__________ :________ :__________ speak when given the opportunity.
definitely probably probably definitely 
should not should not should should
OR
boyfriend/girlfriend 
My husband/wife doesn't care whether
I speak when given the opportunity or not.
boyfriend/girlfriend
12. My husband/wife thinks that I__________ :__________ :________ : sign up for the Speech Workshop.
definitely probably probably definitely 
should not should not should should
OR
boyfriend/girlfriend 
My husband/wife doesn’t care whether
I sign up for the Speech Workshop or not. 00oo
13. Doing what your instructor thinks you should do is:
extremely bad quite bad slightly bad undecided slightly good quite good extremely good
14. Doing what your classmates think you should do is:
extremely bad quite bad slightly bad undecided slightly good quite good extremely good
15. Doing what your close friends think you should do is:
extremely bad quite bad slightly bad undecided slightly good quite good extremely good
16. Doing what your boyfriend/girlfriend or husband/wife thinks you should do is:




SIGN UP SHEET FOR THE SPEECH 211 WORKSHOP
THURSDAY, JUNE 16, 1977 
ROOM 141 
2:00 P.M.
I, _______________________________________________DO or DO NOT (circle one)
PRINT NAME
want to sign up for the Speech 211 Workshop.
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Assessment of the Bi Component
Place an "X" in the space which most closely reflects the amount of 
agreement or disagreement you feel for each statement listed. Be sure to 
answer every question.
1. Speaking at every opportunity will lead to my meeting new people.
I myself I myself Undecided I myself I myself
strongly disagree agree strongly
disagree agree
2. Speaking at every opportunity will make my instructor think that I 
am interested in the course and concerned about my performance in 
the class.
I myself I myself Undecided I myself I myself
strongly disagree agree strongly
disagree agree
3. Speaking at every opportunity will lead to a better relationship 
between my instructor and myself-
I myself I myself Undecided I myself I myself
strongly disagree agree strongly
disagree agree
4. signing up for the Speech Workshop will give me more public speak­
ing experience.
I myself I myself Undecided I myself I myself
strongly disagree agree strongly
disagree agree
5. Signing up for the Speech Workshop will give me an advantage over 
students in my class who do not sign up.
I myself I myself Undecided I myself I myself
strongly disagree agree strongly
disagree agree
6. The benefits gained by signing up for the Speech Workshop will out­
weigh the time spent in preparing for and participating in the 
Workshop.
I myself 1 myself Undecided I myself I myself
strongly disagree agree strongly
disagree agree
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7. Signing up for the Speech Workshop will make my instructor think 
that 1 am interested in the course and concerned about my per­
formance in the class.
I myself I myself Undecided I myself I myself
strongly disagree agree strongly
disagree agree
8. Speaking at every opportunity will give me more public speaking 
experience.
I myself I myself Undecided I myself I myself
strongly disagree agree strongly
disagree agree
Speaking at every opportunity will give me an advantage over 
students in my class who do not speak at every opportunity.
I myself I myself Undecided I myself I myself
strongly disagree agree strongly
disagree agree
10. Signing up for the Speech Workshop will lead to my meeting new 
people.
I myself I myself Undecided I myself I myself
strongly disagree agree strongly
disagree agree
11. Signing up for the Speech Workshop will lead to a better relation­
ship between my instructor and myself.
I myself I myself Undecided I myself I myself
strongly disagree agree strongly
disagree agree
12. The benefits gained by speaking at every opportunity will outweigh 
the time spent in preparing for and participating in speaking 
opportunities.
I myself I myself Undecided I myself I myself







Signing up for the Speech Workshop will make me a better public 
speaker.
I myself I myself Undecided I myself I myself
strongly disagree agree strongly
disagree agree
Speaking at every opportunity will reduce my stage fright.
I myself I myself Undecided I myself I myself
strongly disagree agree strongly
disagree agree
Speaking at every opportunity will make me a better public speaker.
I myself I myself Undecided I myself I myself
strongly disagree agree strongly
disagree agree
Signing up for the Speech Workshop will reduce my stage fright.
I myself I myself Undecided I myself I myself
strongly disagree agree strongly
disagree agree
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Assessment of the Ai Component
Place an "X" in the space which best describes how you personally feel 
about each statement. Be sure to answer every question.
1. Meeting new people is:
extremely quite slightly undecided slightly quite extremely 
bad bad bad good good good
2. Having a better relationship with my instructor is:
extremely quite slightly undecided slightly quite extremely 
bad bad bad good good good
3. Reducing my stage fright is:
extremely quite slightly undecided slightly quite extremely 
bad bad bad good good good
4. Giving up my free time in order to gain the benefits of a speaking 
experience is:
extremely quite slightly undecided slightly quite extremely 
had bad bad good good good
5. Being a better public speaker is:
extremely quite slightly undecided slightly quite extremely 
bad bad bad good good good
6 . Having an advantage over the other students in the class is:
extremely quite slightly undecided slightly quite extremely 
bad bad bad good good good
7. Gaining more public speaking experience is:
extremely quite slightly undecided slightly quite extremely 
bad bad bad good good good
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8. Having my instructor view me as being interested in the course and 
concerned about my performance in the class is:
extremely quite slightly undecided slightly quite extremely 




I'm from the LSU Speech Department, and I'm in charge of the 
Speech 211 Workshop tomorrow at 2:00 P.M. I just wanted to talk to you 
a little about signing up for the Workshop. I realize that signing up 
for this Workshop will take up some of your free time, however, I think 
that after you hear about some of the beneficial aspects of this Work­
shop, you'll agree that the rewards of participating will far outweigh 
any costs.
I believe that signing up for this Workshop will help you be a 
better public speaker and thus help you in your 211 class. Your relation­
ship with your instructor should improve, your stage fright should be 
reduced, and, finally, signing up for the Workshop will give you an 
opportunity to meet some new people. Let me be more specific.
First, and perhaps most important, signing up for this Workshop 
should make you a better speaker. There's nothing like getting some 
practical speaking experience in an informal, relaxed situation where you 
can look at yourself objectively and compare yourself to other Speech 211 
students. Remember, though, there won't be any grades or critiques—  
absolutely no pressure. This Workshop is designed to be an enjoyable 
speaking experience.
Second, I believe that those of you who sign up for the Workshop 
will do better in your 211 class. As a result of signing up for the
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Workshop and participating in it, you will probably be able to make your 
speeches for your 211 class better. You might get some new ideas for 
speeches or some helpful hints and suggestions from the other speakers 
who participate. As a result, signing up for the Workshop will cer­
tainly give you an advantage over the students in your class who do not 
sign up.
Third, and this relates to the point I was just making, it is 
highly probable that your relationship with your 211 instructor will im­
prove if you sign up for the Workshop. I’m sure you already know that 
all the 211 instructors will be there. They can't help but think that 
you are interested in the course and concerned about your performance in 
the class when they see you participating.
The fourth benefit of signing up for the Speech Workshop is a 
major one for a lot of students. Since the Workshop will be an informal, 
relaxed situation, your stage fright should be reduced. Thus, you should 
feel less nervous and more confident about your speaking ability.
Finally, by signing up for the Speech Workshop, you'll have the 
opportunity to meet some new people. All of the 211 classes will be 
represented.
So, all things considered, the Workshop will be a learning exper­
ience as well as an enjoyable time for all. Therefore, I urge you to 
sign up for the Speech 211 Workshop.
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Ao Message
I'm from the LSU Speech Department, and I'm in charge of the 
Speech 211 Workshop tomorrow at 2:00 P.M. I just wanted to talk to you 
a little about speaking when the opportunity arises. The usual reason 
students give for not participating in speaking opportunities is that 
they will take up some of their free time. However, I think that after 
you hear some of the beneficial aspects of speaking whenever the oppor­
tunity arises, you'll agree that the rewards of speaking far outweigh 
any costs.
I believe that speaking at every opportunity will help you be a 
better public speaker and thus help you in your 211 class. Your rela­
tionship with your instructor should improve if you speak as often as 
possible, and your stage fright should be reduced. Also, if you take 
advantage of speaking opportunities you will meet new people. Let me be 
more specific.
First, and perhaps most important, speaking at every opportunity 
should make you a better speaker. There's nothing like getting some 
practical speaking experience in order to look at yourself objectively 
and to compare yourself with other speakers. Furthermore, in speaking 
situations outside the classroom, the pressure is off— there are no 
grades or critiques to worry about. Therefore, I think you can see that 
speaking at every opportunity can be an enjoyable experience.
Second, I think that by seizing every opportunity to speak, you 
will do better in your 211 class. This is a good way to get some new 
ideas for speeches or some helpful hints and suggestions from other 
speakers. These new ideas and helpful hints, in turn, should help you
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make your speeches for this class better. Thus, you certainly will have 
an advantage over the students in your class who do not speak at every 
opportunity.
Third, and this relates to the point I was just making, it is 
highly probable that your relationship with your 211 instructor will im­
prove if you speak when given the opportunity. Your instructor can't 
help but think that you are interested in the course and concerned about 
your performance in the class if you participate in speaking opportuni­
ties.
The fourth benefit of speaking at every opportunity is a major 
one for a lot of students. With every speaking experience, stage fright 
should be reduced. And, if you speak every time you have the oppor­
tunity, you should feel less nervous and more confident about your speak­
ing ability.
Finally, by speaking at every opportunity, you'll have the oppor­
tunity to meet some new people.
So, all things considered, speaking at every opportunity is a 
learning experience and can be an enjoyable one. Therefore, I urge you 
to sign up for the Speech 211 Workshop.
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Aacte Message
I'n from the LSU Speech Department, and I'm in charge of the 
Speech 211 Workshop tomorrow at 2:00 P.M. 1 just wanted to talk to you 
a little about signing up for the Workshop. I realize that signing up 
for this Workshop will take up some of your free time, however, I think 
that after you hear about some of the beneficial aspects of this Work­
shop, you'll agree that the rewards of participating will far outweigh 
ar > costs.
Previous participants in the Workshop have reported that those 
who sign up become better speakers and receive advice which helps them 
in their 211 classes. These same participants reported improved rela­
tionships with instructors, a reduction in stage fright, and ’in oppor­
tunity to meet some new people. Let me be more specific.
First, and perhaps most important, according to studies conducted 
by communication researchers, signing up for this Workshop should make 
you a better speaker. These researchers have found that the best way to 
get practical speaking experience is in informal, relaxed situations like 
the Speech Workshop in which you have the opportunity to look at your­
self objectively and compare yourself to other Speech 211 students. Re­
member, though, there won't be any grades or critiques--absolutely no 
pressure. This Workshop is designed to be an enjoyable speaking 
experience.
Second, former students have reported that signing up for the 
Speech Workshop will help you do better in your 211 class. As a result 
of signing up for the Workshop and participating in it, you should be 
able to make your speeches for your 211 class better, according to these
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previous participants. Another benefit reported by these students is 
that you will get some new ideas for speeches or some helpful hints and 
suggestions from the other speakers who participate. As a result, sign­
ing up for the Workshop certainly will give you an advantage over the 
students in your class who do not sign up.
Third, and this relates to the point I was just making, it is 
highly probable that your relationship with your 211 instructor will im­
prove if you go to the Workshop. I'm sure you already know that they 
will be there. Instructors have repeatedly told me that they view those 
students who sign up as being interested in the course and concerned 
about their performance in the class.
The fourth benefit of signing up for the Speech Workshop is a 
major one for a lot of students. According to James C. McCroskey, a 
well-known authority in the field of communication apprehension, stage 
fright is reduced a little every time a student participates in a speak­
ing situation. Since this Workshop will be an informal, relaxed situa­
tion, McCroskey's findings about the reduction of stage fright should be 
particularly true. You should feel less nervous and more confident about 
your speaking ability.
Finally, by signing up for the Speech Workshop, you'll get to 
meet some new people. All of the 211 classes will be represented.
So, all things considered, the Workshop will be a learning ex­
perience as well as an enjoyable time for all. Therefore, I urge you to
sign up for the Speech 211 Workshop.
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Aoe Message
I'm from the LSU Speech Department, and I'm in charge of the 
Speech 211 Workshop tomorrow at 2:00 P.M. I just wanted to talk to you 
a little about speaking when the opportunity arises. The usual reason 
students give for not participating in speaking opportunities is that 
they will take up some of their free time. However, I think that after 
you hear some of the beneficial aspects of speaking whenever the oppor­
tunity arises, you'll agree that the rewards of speaking far outweigh 
any costs.
Former students have reported that those students who take advan­
tage of every speaking opportunity become better public speakers and re­
ceive advice which helps them in their 211 classes. These same students 
also reported improved relationships with instructors, a reduction in 
stage fright, and an opportunity to meet some new people. Let me be more 
specific.
First, and perhaps most important, according to studies conducted 
by communication researchers, speaking at every opportunity should make 
you a better speaker. These researchers have found that the best way to 
get practical speaking experience is to participate— every time you have 
the opportunity. Thus, you have a chance to look at yourself objectively 
and to compare yourself with other speakers. Furthermore, in speaking 
situations outside the classroom, the pressure is off— there are no 
grades or critiques to worry about. Therefore, I think you can see that 
speaking at every opportunity can be an enjoyable experience.
Second, former students have reported that speaking at every 
opportunity helped them do better in their 211 classes. Therefore, if 
you, too, speak when given the opportunity, you should be able to make
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your speeches for this class better. Another benefit reported by these 
students is that you will get some new ideas for speeches or some helpful 
hints and suggestions from other speakers. As a result, you certainly 
will have an advantage over the other students in your class who do not 
speak at every opportunity.
Third, and this relates to the p^xnt I was just making, it is 
highly probable that your relationship with your 211 instructor will im­
prove is you speak when given the opportunity. Instructors have 
repeatedly told me that they view those students who speak at every op­
portunity as being interested in the course and concerned about their 
performance in the class.
The fourth benefit of speaking at every opportunity is a major 
one for a lot of students. According to James C. McCroskey, a well- 
known authority in the field of communication apprehension, stage fright 
is reduced a little every time a student participates in a speaking 
situation. Since speaking events outside the classroom are generally 
more informal and relaxed, McCroskey's findings should be particularly 
true. You should feel less nervous and more confident about your speak­
ing ability.
Finally, by speaking at every opportunity, you'll get to meet 
some new people.
So, all things considered, speaking at every opportunity is a 
learning experience and can be an enjoyable one. Therefore, I urge you 
to sign up for the Speech 211 Workshop.
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